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Abstract
The Global Financial and Economic Crisis involve complex interaction among diverse causal
factors. This article seeks to ascertain the policy implications of countries’ exposure and
responses to these twin crises. It does so by comparing five economies – The United States,
United Kingdom, Iceland, Greece, and Canada - according to their economic performance
through the crises. This comparison aims to discern why Canada’s performance surpassed
that of the other four cases. The paper compares countries’ financial regulations and initial
exposure to the financial crisis, as well as monetary and fiscal policy responses to mitigate
the crisis and recession. It finds that monetary and fiscal stimulus were useful in mitigating
economic contraction, in line with Keynesian economic theory. However, initial financial
sector soundness, based on effective regulatory and corporate governance, was the key
determinant of exposure to – and ultimate economic impact of - the financial crisis.

Keywords
Political economy, financial crisis, economic crisis, recession, Canada, United States, US,
United Kingdom, UK, Greece, Iceland, Keynes, financial governance, financial regulation.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1

Research Question and Hypothesis

An accurate understanding of the global financial crisis and recession of 2007-2009,
which has resulted in ongoing economic and political crises in North America and
Europe, must necessarily consider the diverse experiences of different economies.

1

Canada initially suffered alongside other developed economies, but experienced a less
severe recession as well as a relatively rapid recovery. By 2010 Canadian commodity
prices had recovered about half of the losses experienced through 2008-2009, and
average prices on the Toronto stock exchange had nearly returned to their 2007 peak.

2

After contracting 2.6% in 2009, Canadian real GDP grew 3.3% in 2010, followed by an
3

increase of 2.2% in 2011. By the end of 2011, unemployment in Canada had returned to
4

below where it was in January 2009. While Canada’s initial unemployment rate was
higher than in other countries at the onset of recession, it has experienced a more rapid
correction than elsewhere. While Canadian and American unemployment rates stood at
6.1% and 5.8% respectively in 2008, the Canadian unemployment rate peaked at 8.3% in
2009 compared to 9.6% in the US. In terms of recovery, Canada’s unemployment rate
had dropped to 7.5% by 2011, while unemployment in the US stood steady at 9%.

5

Relatively little has been written specifically regarding Canada’s relative performance
through the financial crisis and recession.6 This research paper aims to address this gap in

1

For an exhaustive survey of the academic literature on the financial crisis in general, consult Robert W.
Kolb, ed. “Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future.” Hoboken,
NJ: John Wiley & sons, 2010.
2
Statistics Canada, “Chapter 9: Economic Accounts,” Canada Yearbook 2010 (2010): 118. Accessed April
25, 2012. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-402-x/2011000/pdf/economic-economique-eng.pdf.
3
Statistics Canada, “Chapter 9: Economic Accounts,” 118; Statistics Canada, “Economic Indicators, by
Province and Territory,” last modified April 25, 2012, accessed April 25, 2012.
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/indi02a-eng.htm.
4
Statistics Canada, “Study: Inside the Labour Market Downturn,” last modified July 5, 2011, accessed
April 25, 2012. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/110223/dq110223b-eng.htm.
5
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Statistical Extracts,” Accessed April 26,
2012. http://stats.oecd.org.

2

the academic literature. The question is thus posed: Why did Canada fare better through
the recent financial crisis and recession than other economies?
8
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Figure 2 Unemployment Rates by Country

6

For consideration of Canada in post-crisis financial globalization see: Patrick Leblond, “Canada, the
European Union, and Transatlantic Financial Governance,” International Journal vol. 66 no. 2 (2005): 5772. For a broader cross-country comparison of countries’ experience of the economic crisis see: Stephen G.
Cecchetti, Michael King and James Yetman, “Weathering the Financial Crisis: Good Policy or Good
Luck?” BIS Working Paper Series no. 351 (2011). Accessed March 20, 2012.
http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/11fmc_cecchetti.pdf.

3

1.2

Methodology

This paper will compare the experiences of several economies through the financial crisis
and recession. These experiences will be evaluated according to macroeconomic
benchmarks such as GDP growth and unemployment. Each country case study will also
assess: the country’s financial makeup and regulatory regime, which determined initial
exposure to transmission of the global financial crisis; the country’s exposure to the
ensuing global recession through trade networks; the country’s monetary policy response
through the manipulation of interest rates and quantitative easing; the country’s fiscal
policy response through fiscal stimulus and bail-outs of systemically important financial
institutions. Countries’ fiscal positions going into the crisis will also be considered, as
this affects the range of fiscal and monetary response options available to governments.
This paper employs a comparative research method in order to assess the variables
outlined in this section – regulatory causes of the crisis, financial interventions, and
monetary and fiscal policy responses - as they interacted with different politicaleconomic systems through the course of the financial crisis and recession. Qualitative and
quantitative methods are employed: approaches to financial regulation and corporate
governance constitute examples of the former; economic benchmarks such as
unemployment and GDP growth are examples of the latter. Needless to say, any
comparative study of global macroeconomic phenomena is subject to considerable
7

extraneous variance. This research design has been selected due to the historical nature
of the topic. It is not possible to induce and evaluate macroeconomic crises in a
laboratory, nor would it be ethical to do so. This paper thus undertakes Hopkin’s primary
use of comparison in political science, that “of developing, testing, and refining theories
8

about causal relationships…” By comparing Canada to several other economies which
varyingly conform to our selected policy variables, it should be possible to assess the
influence of these variables on Canada’s performance through the crisis. The correlation

7

Jonathan Hopkin, “The Comparative Method,” in Theory and Methods in Political Science, third ed. by
David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 292.
8
Hopkin, “The Comparative Method,” 285.

4

of performance outcomes to variables will allow an evaluation of the primary hypothesis
of this paper.
The preliminary hypothesis is that, while still affected by a recession due to transmission
9

through trade channels , Canada did not suffer from the primary blow of a financial crisis
as did the United States and Europe. This was due largely to the more robust and
comprehensive standards of financial governance present in Canada, as well as a strong
fiscal position going into the crisis. Moreover, the implicit guarantee provided by the
Canadian government to financial institutions helped maintain investor confidence in
Canadian banks, mitigating the uncertainty-fueled instability which so weakened
financial firms and national bond markets elsewhere.
10

While Canada’s regulatory framework has to do with history and culture , the role of
government intervention in moderating economic uncertainty is a staple of Keynesian
theory and will be given prescriptive consideration in the comparison with other
economies. It is important to note that the financial crisis and recession were separate,
though highly interconnected, events. Policy responses to the financial crisis included the
temporary offering of discount loans to, and in some cases recapitalization of, national
financial institutions. The economic crisis - the recession - was addressed through fiscal
and (unprecedented) monetary expansion.

11

The case studies selected and their reasons for inclusion are: Canada, as the economy
under primary consideration; the United States, as the world’s largest economy and the
epicentre of the financial crisis; Greece, as an extreme example of the effect of eurozone
membership and subsequent lack of monetary policy autonomy in addressing the crisis;
Iceland, as an example of a non-eurozone country with extremely high exposure to the
financial crisis and limited response capacity due to its small size; the United Kingdom,

9

Rudolfs Bems, Robert C. Johnson, and Kei-Mu Yi, “Demand Spillovers and the Collapse of Trade in the
Global Recession,” IMF Economic Review vol. 58 no. 2 (2010): 321.
10
Donald Brean, Lawrence Kryzanowski, and Gordon Roberts, “Canada and the United States: Different
roots, different routes to financial sector regulation,” Business History vol. 53 no. 2 (2011): 260.
11
John E. Marthinsen, “Four Paradoxes of the 2008-2009 Economic and Financial Crisis,” in Lessons from
the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future, ed. Robert W. Kolb (Hoboken NJ:
John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 60.

5

as an example of a highly-developed non-eurozone country with a greater range of policy
response options. Comparing these country case studies will demonstrate the relative
importance of the policies mentioned, highlighting the importance of prudent fiscal
management and financial regulation in times of economic growth, thus allowing
governments the capacity to mitigate the effects of unexpected economic shocks. This in
turn conforms to an essentially Keynesian prescription for macroeconomic policy
approaches. It should be noted that this comparative study involves two distinct but
connected dependent variables: the effectiveness of policy responses in stimulating
economic recovery and the resumption of growth, and the factors which determined
exposure to the financial crisis. This dual consideration affected case selection.
Specifically, Greece was selected as a prime exemplar of the former, while being of
limited analytical value regarding the latter.
This paper finds that economies which received fiscal stimulus (the US and Canada)
performed better than those whose governments pursued austerity (the UK and Greece).
Iceland did not engage in fiscal stimulus due to the contraction of economic activities and
government revenues, however it did engage in monetary expansion in the aftermath of
the financial collapse. Greece is the only case study in which monetary expansion was
not pursued, due to the constraints of its shared currency. The soundness of countries’
financial sectors (or public finances in the case of Greece), debt levels, and risk exposure
were the primary determinants of vulnerability to the financial crisis, which in turn
influenced the severity of recession. The size of countries’ financial sectors relative to
their economy also influenced outcomes – Greece was unable to recapitalize its banks
because their assets exceeded total GDP by a factor of ten. The US, despite facing a
titanic financial meltdown, was able to engage in extensive monetary and fiscal stimulus
by drawing on the resources of the world’s largest economy. The unique position of the
US dollar as the world’s reserve currency also facilitated the American response. Such
idiosyncratic national conditions should be kept in mind, and do constitute extraneous
variables.
Canadian banks followed more conservative business and lending models than their
foreign counterparts, and had a closer relationship with government in terms of both

6

regulatory oversight before the crisis and liquidity support through its duration. The cartel
structure of the Canadian banking industry also helped to reduce the informational
asymmetries which contributed to excessive risk-taking elsewhere, as banks had access to
more information about each others’ activities and balance sheets. In every other case
study, governments lacked either the institutional capacity or political will to rein in the
reckless growth of banks’ liabilities (or public debt in the Greek case).

1.3

Theoretical Overview

The stock market crash of 1929 which led to the Great Depression contributed to a
widely held view that financial markets are inherently unstable, expressed most famously
in the theories of John Maynard Keynes and Hyman Minsky.

12

Keynes and his disciples

predicted that the concentration of wealth would drain the purchasing power of the
middle and lower classes, those most likely to consistently support demand for goods and
services. Such an economy would become “dangerously dependent on the luxury
spending of the wealthy few and on unsustainably high levels of private investment.”

13

Such an economy would be susceptible to a liquidity trap wherein expectations of falling
demand and profit would prevent new investment, in which case the government would
be the only viable driver of economic growth. Such fiscal profligacy would require a
central bank willing to maintain low interest rates, and financial regulation to control
credit and prevent it from relocating into speculative bubbles.

14

Instability arising from the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of financial
markets prompted a paradigm shift toward much more comprehensive state regulation of
financial markets in the postwar period. In the 1970’s and 80’s economic malaise and the
ascension of efficient market theory drove a shift in the opposite direction, away from a

12

James Crotty, “Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: a Critical Assessment of the ‘New
Financial Architecture’,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 33 (2009): 563.
13
Timothy A Canova, “Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: from Market
Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model,” Harvard Law & Policy Review 3 no. 2 (2009):
371.
14
Canova, “Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law,” “Financial Market Failure as a Crisis
in the Rule of Law,” 372-75.

7

statist Keynesian model and toward “globally-integrated deregulated neoliberal
capitalism.”

15

The last three decades have seen increasing global integration of financial

markets which have been decreasingly regulated at the national level. This has allowed
innovation in financial transactions, which critics of neoliberal theory argue have
“stimulated powerful financial booms,” typically ending in crisis and the necessity of
state intervention.

16

Debate over the economic role of the state has two dimensions in this paper: One is the
immediate policy responses to the crisis, generally varying between fiscal stimulus and
austerity (even in cases where austerity was chosen, monetary expansion was still
generally employed); the second arena of contention regards the role of the state in
economic, and especially financial, governance. The comparison of policy responses in
this paper thus considers stimulative Keynesian versus austere neoliberal approaches. The
American and Canadian responses typically favoured fiscal expansion along roughly
Keynesian lines. The Greek and British cases saw a general adherence to austerity,
although in the Greek case this is complicated by exogenous influences stemming from
membership in the European currency. The Icelandic case is a prime example of the
dynamics which drove the financial meltdown, although Iceland’s policy responses were
largely outside of real government control due to the scale of the financial collapse.
The second set of considerations concerns the systemic instability which caused the
crisis, and has to do with longer-term financial governance. The US, UK, Greek and
Icelandic cases all demonstrate failures of financial governance to varying degrees, while
the Canadian case provides a counterpoint of relatively successful and conservative
financial sector management. This dimension considers more broadly statist versus freemarket approaches to financial governance, but can still be related to the
Keynesian/neoliberal debate in its emphasis on the role of government intervention in
mitigating the amplitude of economic fluctuations. Indeed, to focus merely on policy
response without considering the broader framework of state economic regulation would

15
16

Crotty, “Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis,” 564.
Crotty, “Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis,” 564.

8

be to misinterpret Keynes. To only focus on monetary and fiscal stimulus post-crisis is to
ignore the broader Keynesian policy goals, such as more equal income distribution.
Those who would favour stimulus and bailouts in the absence of more comprehensive,
state-mandated economic and financial governance have in fact been labeled
“Commercial Keynesians,” “Wall Street Keynesians,” or, more bluntly, “Bastard
Keynesians.”

17

Critics on the left highlight the incentives for financial firm operators and ratings
agencies to generate as great a volume of highly-rated securitized debt as possible.
Compensation structures and the transfer of liability in the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model
are argued to undermine the theory that deregulated markets will distribute risk where it
is best able to be borne.

18

The accurate calculation of risk in pricing complex securities –

Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS’s) which pool hundreds of mortgages and
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO’s) which include dozens of MBS’s – has been
argued to be impossible in practical terms. Regulators meanwhile stood aside and let
banks and ratings agencies decide what constituted appropriate levels of leverage, risk,
and capital. This obvious conflict of interest led firms to use risk management models
which vastly underestimated loss exposure, stimulating risky investments through
compensation structures which encouraged such practices.

19

These transgressions by

actors in a market free of government intervention militate against the laissez-faire
approach to financial market regulation which is central to neoliberal philosophy.
The Keynesian prescription for responding to recessions advocates public spending to
stimulate demand, once the scope of monetary policy has been exhausted as interest rates
approach zero percent.

20

Neoliberal proponents advocate instead a reduction of state

spending and dogged pursuit of a balanced budget, with the aim of increasing business
confidence and the role of the private sector. The Thatcher and Reagan administrations of

17

Canova, “Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law,” 389.
Crotty, “Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis,” 565-66.
19
Crotty, “Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis,” 568-72.
20
Maurice Mullard, ” “Explanations of the Financial Meltdown and the Present Recession,” The Political
Quarterly 82 no. 2 (2011): 204.
18

9

the 1980’s in the United Kingdom and United States, respectively, are often cited as
prime examples of this policy framework, despite the fact that public spending as a
21

proportion of GDP increased in both countries at this time.

One extreme area of debate

during the crisis was the partial nationalisation of insolvent banks. The IMF estimates the
total global cost of bank bailouts during the crisis at around $16 trillion.

22

This

expenditure of public funds was undertaken to maintain business confidence in the
survivability of financial institutions. It should be noted, however, that bailouts do not
conform to the Keynesian prescription of undertaking fiscal stimulus to support aggregate
economic demand.
The instability of American financial institutions, transmitted worldwide through
globalized financial networks, stemmed from an asset bubble of overvalued real estate
assets and their associated securities and derivatives. This in turn can be traced to the
shift to an “originate-to-distribute” model of securitization, characterized by moral
hazard. Moral hazard arises if institutions are not required to maintain the debt they
originate, and thus do not bear the risk they generate, but instead pass it on to others
without sufficient transparency of default risk. The unregulated securities market played a
critical role in generating the crisis, experiencing a run as an unprotected market “much
as commercial banks and thrift institutions had been exposed to runs prior to the creation
of deposit insurance.”

23

On the other side of the ideological divide, free market proponents can credibly point to
the role of government in creating conditions which allowed the housing bubble to arise.
These include the policy of promoting low-income home-ownership dating back to the
post-war period which was continued under the Clinton and Bush administrations, as well
as the maintenance of low interest rates after the recession of 2001.

24

These policies

encouraged the explosion of credit and debt of the early 2000’s. From this perspective,
the problem is not that a neoliberal policy platform was followed, but that it was not

21

Mullard, “Explanations of the Financial Meltdown and the Present Recession,” 204.
Mullard, “Explanations of the Financial Meltdown and the Present Recession,” 205.
23
Mullard, “Explanations of the Financial Meltdown and the Present Recession,” 213.
24
Mullard, “Explanations of the Financial Meltdown and the Present Recession,” 209.
22

10

followed closely enough. Countercyclical policies to prevent economic bubbles are thus
argued to have a disproportionate effect on market dynamism and overall prosperity.
Another major area of theoretical debate is whether the crisis was inevitable – that is,
bubbles just happen – or whether specific policy decisions allowed it to occur.
Canada’s financial sector, government, and broader economy conformed to
countercyclical patterns of investment and savings, whereas the other cases in this paper
were procyclical in these regards, making them more vulnerable to sudden reverses
starting in 2007. Significantly, Canada’s banking system has united commercial and
investment banking since before the 1980’s, preceding the American repeal of GlassSteagall by several decades. The common criticism that the financial crisis was caused by
the American move to universal banking is thus not supported by the findings in this
paper. The Canadian experience demonstrates that banks can be large and universal, but
that they must be stable and transparent. This suggests not an avoidance of allowing firms
to become ‘too big to fail’, but a recognition that such firms must be subject to close
government oversight due to the element of public good in their activities. This again
supports a statist-interventionist approach to overall economic governance. Adam Smith
himself advocated constraints to private liberty for individuals whose actions might
endanger the broader society, especially regarding banks.

25

It is here argued that the only

remedy for such a crisis is prevention, in the form of more comprehensive and proactive
regulatory oversight as well as improved risk transparency in securities markets. Potential
avenues for improvement in financial governance at the national and international level
are therefore considered in the conclusion.
The first case study in this paper examines the history and growth of the subprime
housing asset bubble leading to the financial crisis. As the economic and political leader
of the free (market) world, the United States is where the financial crisis, and this
analysis, begin.

25

Otmar Issing, “Some Lessons from the Financial Market Crisis,” International Finance 12 no. 3 (2009):
437.

11

2

UNITED STATES

As the epicentre of the global financial crisis, the United States is a necessary starting
point for analysis. As the wave of deregulation culminated in the repeal of the GlassSteagall Act in 1999, the US saw the rise of large financial conglomerates with
investment and commercial banking portfolios. The 2004 decision to allow banks to carry
assets in structured off-balance sheet entities, reaffirmed in Basel II26 the same year,
created the conditions for the explosion of asset-backed securitization. The increase in
systemic risk from the widespread trade in asset-backed securities and derivatives,
financed through short-term borrowing, was not addressed by regulators at the Securities
and Exchange Commission or the Federal Reserve. This failure in both corporate and
public governance resulted in the freeze of credit markets when the value of underlying
assets began to collapse in 2007.

Global financial linkages and the highly leveraged position of financial institutions turned
this freeze in short-term lending into a threat to the solvency of some of the world’s
largest financial firms. In the United States, this resulted in a massive bank rescue by the
federal government, as well as monetary and fiscal expansion to combat the resulting
drop in economic activity. As the world’s largest economy and leading financial power,
the experience of the US is vital to an understanding of the dynamics underlying the
financial and economic crisis. As the source of the crisis and the leader in global financial
governance, the policy lessons drawn from the US case are crucial to preventing such a
crisis in the future. Monetary and fiscal stimulus were employed to combat the effects of
financial and economic crisis, and were generally successful in this despite the limited
transmission of monetary expansion through the financial sector to the broader economy.
The lack of effective regulatory oversight and micro-prudential management are seen as
the primary factors affecting the generation and severity of the financial crisis.

26

Since the 1980’s the rules governing capital adequacy for financial institutions have been outlined in the
internationally-recognized Basel Accord. Current standards are outlined under “Basel II”, although the
amendments proposed in 2010 (“Basel III”) would raise capital requirements. Leblond, “Canada, the
European Union, and Transatlantic Financial Governance,” 68.

12

2.1

Financial Regulation

Deficient regulation comprises one prominent perspective regarding the origination of the
financial crisis in the United States. It has been observed that regulators were
insufficiently concerned with banks’ off-balance sheet activities and the potential
bursting of the real estate asset price bubble, and that they failed to perform appropriate
27

institutional stress tests.

Kaufman and Malliaris point out that the United States is “the

only major country that neither publishes a financial stability report” analyzing financial
system fragility and vulnerability to shocks, “nor participates in the IMF-World Bank
Financial Sector Assessment Program, which evaluates bank fragility.”

28

Before the

crisis, bank regulators and the Federal Reserve possessed the legal authority to require
higher capital ratios for banks and to monitor the off-balance sheet activities of bank
holding companies. It has thus also been argued that the financial meltdown was not so
much a regulatory failure as “a failure of regulators.”

29

The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 largely freed
banks from previous ceilings on depositary and mortgage interest rates, and liberalized
restrictions on new financial innovations. This opened a decade of financial
liberalization, which saw the dismantling of the intricate credit controls which had
mitigated systemic risk by preventing a subprime mortgage market for borrowers with
bad credit from developing.

30

The counter-Keynesian revolution culminated in the 1999

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, which removed many
elements of the 1929 Glass-Steagall Act mandating the separation of commercial banking
and insurance companies from engaging in generally-riskier investment banking.

31

One

of the main lobbyists for this legislation was Robert Rubin, former head of Goldman
Sachs and later Treasury Secretary in the Clinton administration. Rubin pushed for the
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deregulatory bill even as he was negotiating his transition from the Treasury to a co-chair
position at Citigroup. Despite this obvious conflict of interest, Rubin was never charged
for unethical behaviour.

32

This illustrates the degree to which regulatory capture and the

“revolving door” between industry and government helped drive financial deregulation.
In 2004 the American Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) greatly increased the
amount of leverage investment banks could hold under pressure from then-Goldman
Sachs chair and current Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson. The SEC raised
acceptable leverage from twelve times held capital to forty times, while also making
compliance voluntary.

33

This decision crucially allowed the use of off-balance sheet

entities including Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV’s), exempting firms from capital
requirements for their investments in asset-backed securities and credit derivatives.

34

From 1981 to 2007 financial asset values in the US grew from four times total GDP to
ten times, household debt increased from 48% of GDP to 100%, and private sector debt
rose from 123% of GDP to 290%. Financial sector debt rose from 22% of GDP in this
period to 117%. The financial sector accrued 10% of corporate profits in the early 1980’s
compared to 40% in 2006, growing from a 6% share of total stock market value to 23%
in the same period.

35

Clearly the financial leveraging, or debt-based investment, allowed by deregulation since
the 1980’s has been vastly profitable for the financial sector, and has allowed growth in
investment and consumption through the expansion of credit availability. However the
scale of the current crisis implies that the degree of systemic risk needs to be monitored
and managed to prevent the value of financial sophistication from being outweighed by
the socio-economic shocks of rapid deleveraging during crises. According to testimony
by Ben Bernanke to the Financial Crisis Inquiry commission in 2010, American financial
regulation is a landscape of “enormous gaps in authority, duplication of responsibility,
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and unhealthy jurisdictional competition.”

36

Finance has been deregulated, but is not

unregulated, and the structure and execution of regulatory oversight in finance is thus
crucial in managing systemic risk.
Financial regulation is a difficult and highly contested arena of US politics. From 1998 to
2008 the financial industry spent $1.7 billion on campaign contributions and $3.4 billion
on lobbying federal officials.

37

The Obama administration has also been criticized for

delegating management of the crisis to officials who worked extensively on behalf of the
financial industry in support of deregulation. These include Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner, Chief Economic Advisor Larry Summers, and former Treasury Secretary and
Goldman Sachs chair Robert Rubin. It has been argued that this represents a commitment
by this administration to the status quo, and the prioritization of restoring financial sector
profitability rather than overhauling the regulatory system to reduce systemic risk.

2.2

38

The Housing Bubble

The median American family holds most of its wealth in the form of equity in its home,
and it is thus unsurprising that all levels of government adopt policies aimed at increasing
home values.

39

Median home values rose from $30,600 in 1940 to $119,600 by the year

2000 (both in 2000 dollars). Of the net wealth of America’s bottom 95% wealthiest
households, two thirds lies in home equity.

40

Home values thus significantly affect

personal wealth, influencing choices of consumption and investment which powerfully
shape the economy. Through 2008 home prices fell 17%, while stock market values fell
41

37%.

This massive reduction in personal wealth led to decreased spending, especially

on goods, which reduced demand for these goods and related services, resulting in a
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recession. With reduced aggregate demand, unemployment rose 53% from 4.7% to 7.2%
of the workforce, the highest rate since 1993.

42

Unemployment reached 9.3% in 2009,

and in 2010 the American unemployment rate peaked at 9.6% before dropping down to
9.1% in 2011.

43

It is clear that the collapse of financial markets in beginning in 2007 had

enormous and dire consequences for the real economy.
The global financial crisis, originating in the United States in 2007, represented a drastic
simultaneous reappraisal of systemic risk among lending institutions, freezing global
credit markets and affecting global volumes and patterns of trade.44 Systemic risk here
refers to the probability of breakdowns in an entire system (as opposed to individual
components). This can occur through losses at an individual institution which prevent it from
fulfilling its contractual obligations, leading to cumulative losses at other institutions within the
system in a chain reaction of defaults. Systemic risk can also manifest simply through market
reappraisal of participants’ risk, based on the similarity of their risk exposure profile to an initial
loss-suffering entity. This second process has much more to do with “uncertainty” than “risk”
proper, prompting a pattern of market panic and liquidity hoarding until the severely affected
45

institutions are separated from the broader marketplace. Shifts in global financial flows and

growing financial interconnectedness in the preceding decades of globalization created
the global market context for the crisis.
The Asian stock market crash of 1997-98 saw Asian investors direct capital out of the
region in search of ‘safe’ financial markets and to keep exchange rates low but stable for
export-dependent Asian economies.46 This was particularly true of sovereign investors
such as the Chinese central bank, which invested heavily in US government bonds,
“effectively providing a new source of liquidity and low long-term interest...”47 This easy
credit drove a boom in the American housing market, which was also fuelled by
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investors’ flight from the telecom sector after the dotcom crash of 2001.48 That recession,
and the conversion of savings from rapidly growing surplus economies into credit for
consumers and governments in deficit-running consumption economies, triggered an
expansionary monetary policy by the Fed until 2004.49 From 2004-2007 rising
commodity prices and inflationary concerns due to growing Asian demand prompted the
Fed to raise interest rates. Foreign and domestic capital was now redirected towards the
‘safe’ housing market, both through direct investment and indirectly through investment
in US government bonds. Low interest rates from 2001-2004, and subsequent
deregulation allowing off-balance sheet investments, generated the growth of easy credit
in the US economy which fuelled a housing asset bubble.
The recent financial crisis can only be understood in the context of increasing financial
integration and systemic interdependence. In the early twentieth-century American home
mortgages were held by local banks, and mortgage defaults leading to bank failures
tended to be regional in nature and tied to overall regional economic performance. In the
1930’s the Hoover administration created the Federal Home Loan Banks to provide shortterm credit to Savings & Loan companies, laying the groundwork for President Franklin
Roosevelt’s establishment of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or
‘Fannie Mae’). These institutions were intended to provide liquidity to housing markets,
and the role of FNMA specifically was to both buy and insure mortgages.

50

In 1949 the Federal Housing Act created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to
insure home mortgages and build 810,000 units of public housing. These institutions
succeeded in promoting home ownership, which grew from 43.6% of households in 1940
to 61.9% in 1961.

51

FNMA was privatised in 1968, and in 1970 the Federal Home Loan

Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or ‘Freddie Mac’) was established. ‘Freddie’ would not
only make and insure home loans, but would also securitize loans in an effort to create a

48

McKibbin and Stoeckel, “Modelling the Global Financial Crisis,” 585.
John Goddard, Phil Molyneux and John O.S. Wilson, “The Crisis in UK Banking,” Public Money and
Management 29 n. 5 (2009): 277.
50
Congleton, “On the Political Economy of the Financial Crisis and Bailout of 2008-2009,” 290.
51
Congleton, “On the Political Economy of the Financial Crisis and Bailout of 2008-2009,” 290.
49

17

market for mortgage securities and thus spread their associated risk.

52

This would be

done by pooling the value of mortgages and selling these aggregated values as securities,
reducing perceived associated risk to attract investors, and thereby increasing the supply
of mortgages and decreasing their market price.

53

The lower price would result in

mortgages being available to more people of lower incomes, who otherwise would not
qualify, further increasing home ownership in the United States.
Although they were technically private entities, Fannie and Freddie had the implicit
backing of the federal government, and were thus able to borrow at a lower rate. Further
exemptions from many federal and state taxes translated into a roughly $1 billion/year
subsidy for these ‘quasi-national’ enterprises. Freddie also pioneered the use of offbalance sheet entities to hide losses and liabilities.

54

However, since these subsidies and

liabilities were unofficial they did not appear on the government’s balance sheet and so
did not provide fees for what was in essence state insurance. These foregone insurance
fees, which would have been paid were Fannie and Freddie wholly private firms, resulted
in even higher profits which were passed on to shareholders.

55

Following the Federal

Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, Fannie and Freddie
were to be overseen by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and so the
assumption by investors of government backing and support is understandable. Under
this same law, the GSE’s were encouraged by their unofficial government backers to
make ever-riskier home loans in an effort to further promote affordable housing in lowand medium-income areas.
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This expansion of increasingly risky mortgage lending continued under Presidents
Clinton and Bush, essentially allowing housing to be subsidised without congressional
approval or funding. This was the emergence of the ‘sub-prime’ class of mortgages. Subprime mortgages typically carried high fees and consisted of much less documentation
than prime mortgages. They typically also required a much smaller down payment as a
proportion of home value (often less than 10%), and frequently included interest
payments representing over half of a borrower’s income. Their defining characteristic,
however, was their extension to “borrowers with poor credit history or no legitimate
financial capacity to assume mortgage loans.”

57

Sub-prime mortgages thus represent a

primary point of leverage, wherein the borrower takes on debt far in excess of their
assets, which consisted of the small amount of equity in their home.
These revenue streams from the payments on these new mortgages were pooled into
securities considered to be ‘low risk’, creating ‘new’ financial assets. Mortgage-backed
Securities were then marketed to investors in an ‘originate-to-distribute’ model. Banks
would trade these securities through off-balance sheet investment vehicles, or conduits,
referred to as “Structured Investment Vehicles.” The default risk of borrowers was thus
passed on by the originating institution, through these long-maturing SIV’s, to short-term
investors – many of whom in turn were other financial institutions.

58

By June 2008

Fannie and Freddie’s debts and obligations totalled $6.6 trillion, $1.3 trillion more than
the entire US public debt.

59

The new housing-based credit market added to the credit availability generated by low
interest rates, allowing easy refinancing leading to an artificially low mortgage default
rate in the years 2000-2007. The assumption that mortgages could be repaid through
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refinancing worked, as long as house prices continued their decades-long trend of
appreciation. This assumed asset appreciation would allow even low income households
to post their own houses as collateral, which they could always sell in order to repay the
60

loan.

The risk of default was thus theoretically very low, even for low income

households, so long as house prices were increasing. This low default rate, and thus ‘low
risk’, allowed higher profits through lower lending rates. The cycle of high profit through
superficially low risk led major investment banks, the main barometers of market risk
assessment, to uncritically accept the value of mortgages and their derivative securities.

61

The loosening of financial regulations from 1994 through 2004 allowed the merging
(through holding companies) of investment banks, insurance, and securities trading firms
as well as the reduction of capital reserves.

62

Capital reserves were also not required for

“off-balance sheet” entities such as “Structured Investment Vehicles” or SIV’s,
investments whose liabilities did not appear on corporate balance sheets as long as they
could find continual sources of financing. These SIV’s included MBS derivatives such as
collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s).

63

Lenders could now legally take riskier actions,

while the organizations responsible for assessing (and therefore pricing) this risk were
now the same ones who would profit from an artificially low risk assessment. The
perception of low risk was reinforced by default insurance, the provision of which was
dominated by American International Group (AIG).
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In 2004 home ownership in the

United States peaked at 69.2%, which proved popular with voters upon whom the
subtleties of the system were largely lost while its outcome seemed to ‘work’.
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2.3

Bubble Burst and Financial Crisis

In 2003 Fannie and Freddie registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), subjecting them to a mandatory evaluation of accounting practices previously not
required. The Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSE’s) were found to have routinely
and intentionally violated industry best practices when assessing risk and making loans.
This was due to direct encouragement from government which sought to maintain this
off-budget housing subsidy.

66

That the liabilities represented by MBS and CDO markets

were reflected neither on private nor public balance sheets meant that they existed outside
of the regulated banking sector, and by 2007 the market amassed $5.9 trillion in
unregulated assets with no lender of last resort.

67

Opportunities to refinance mortgages began to grow scarce in the wake of rising interest
rates from 2004, with US house prices peaking in mid-2006. As financial room to
manoeuvre shrank, sub-prime mortgages experienced a wave of delinquencies and
foreclosures.

68

In 2005 mortgage defaults began to increase, however MBS financial

products continued to be considered ‘low risk’. Meanwhile, mortgage insurers were
paying more and more to cover increasing defaults, but had maintained insufficient
capital stocks.

69

Because the long-maturing debt-based securities were marketed as short-

term investments which had to be constantly refinanced as investors withdrew their
money, major banks had to cover the gap in credit as lenders stopped reinvesting.

70

Fewer investors reduced demand, lowering prices of debt-based securities. This forced
firms to sell assets to raise short-term cash, which further flooded the market with
securitized assets in a downward price “death spiral.”
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Leverage is used by firms to increase gains (and losses) on investment by using borrowed
funds to purchase assets beyond what their total equity would allow. The higher a firm’s
asset-to-equity ratio is, the greater its leverage and the higher its risk exposure. Firms can
lower this exposure by selling assets to pay off debt, reducing their asset-to-equity
ratios.

72

However, in the event of an economy-wide asset sell-off the value of assets

themselves falls rapidly with demand. Selling these devalued assets at a loss thus reduces
equity as well as – and potentially more than - liabilities. This is exactly what occurred
from December 2007 through March 2009, as the American Dow Jones Industrial
Average declined over 51%.

73

This prevented many companies from deleveraging even

as they attempted to sell off assets and repay debt, as their equity values declined
sufficiently to maintain or even increase their asset-to-equity ratios. Even as some debt
was paid off, its weight against remaining equity did not shrink. Risk exposure thus
remained, keeping investment scarce.
As losses began to outweigh revenues and reserves a severe liquidity crunch emerged as
banks became wary of lending to each other. Through mid- to late-2007 American and
European banks began to warn investors they would receive little if any returns from
certain funds as their values became impossible to determine and interbank refinancing
dried up. It was unclear who possessed these bad assets, which had been so widely
distributed through the financial system.

74

The portfolios of firms invested in the MBS

market (as most large investors were) lost value, leading stocks to plummet as investors
rushed to sell of risky assets. The downward spiral of investment ratings and investor
confidence began to shake the entire financial system.
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The housing price collapse

spread through financial institutions to the wider housing sector. This collapse in house
prices, and thus household wealth, combined with the evaporation of credit markets to
freeze both consumer spending and corporate investment. The financial crisis thus spread
to the real economy, bringing the flow of capital, goods and services to a standstill.
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2.4

Policy Response: Financial

Interventions
In March 2008 Bear Stearns, America’s second largest mortgage lender, was bought by
JPMorganChase for 2% of its book value in a deal whereby the Fed essentially covered
the $30 billion difference by providing loan guarantees.

76

In July 2008, Congress passed

the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA), authorizing the Treasury to buy
unlimited GSE securities to prevent default on GSE obligations, the cost of which was
77

estimated at about $25 billion.

By 2009, revelations of the extent of Fannie and

Freddie’s asset values had increased this cost to over $200 billion, including $40 billion
78

in new credit to the firms.

The entire financial sector bailout is estimated to expose the

US government to an additional $8 trillion in credit risk, as it has in fact entailed greater
implied guarantees to the financial sector.

79

Government attempts to ensure solvency of

large financial firms creates a ‘moral hazard’ of recklessness if banks are seen as ‘too big
to fail’, encouraging riskier (and therefore potentially more profitable) actions because
ultimately it is taxpayers who are accountable for managerial decisions.

80

Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September, 2008 exceeded the scale of any previous
bankruptcy in world history by a factor of six, and fueled the growing panic in financial
markets.

81

The Fed subsequently acquired 80% of AIG in an $85 billion rescue loan.

82

In

late September the US’s largest savings and loan institution, Washington Mutual, was
sold to J.P. Morgan. By the end of September the fourth largest US bank, Wachovia, was
acquired by Citigroup.
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83

To avoid insolvency Fannie and Freddie were (re)nationalized at
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this time, and taxpayers now explicitly guaranteed a large proportion of MBS’s. Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson, who had defended the Bear Stearns’ bailout on the grounds of
financial stability, subsequently pushed for an additional $700 billion in federal funds to
purchase other MBS’s (‘troubled assets’) in order to prevent a wide scale market crash by
propping up demand.

84

When the House of Representatives rejected this Troubled Asset

Relief Program (TARP) at the end of September 2008 world markets began a panicked
sell-off, “wiping out $1 trillion in market value.”

85

While it has commonly been argued that it was the government decision not to prevent
86

the Lehman Brothers’ collapse which drove financial markets into a panic , this is not
necessarily the only explanation. While interbank lending rates did rise somewhat after
the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, markets largely calmed after the intervention to rescue
AIG a few days later.
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Taylor has argued that it was in fact the testimony presented by

Fed chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson on September 23, a
week after Lehman’s collapse, which revealed the severity of the crisis and drove markets
into a tailspin.
“They provided a 2-1/2 page draft of legislation with no mention of
oversight and few restrictions on the use. They were questioned
intensely in this testimony and the reaction was quite negative, judging
by the large volume of critical mail received by many members of the
88
United States Congress.”
Following this testimony, interbank lending rates increased drastically and consistently.
Uncertainty regarding the criteria for government intervention to save financial
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institutions (saving Bear Stearns and AIG but not Lehman Brothers) was exacerbated
rather than mitigated by the vagueness of the TARP legislation.

89

When Congress finally passed the TARP bill in early October, international financial
markets had already undergone severe trauma. The threat of a ‘crisis’ and financial
‘meltdown’ panicked stock markets which continued to plummet in a self-fulfilling
prophecy.

90

Under TARP, significant government transfers were made to the banking

sector and related financial institutions which required a 25% increase in the federal
91

budget and a 7% increase in the total national debt.

The Federal Reserve also began

purchasing MBS’s from Fannie and Freddie in 2008, eventually adding over $1.4 trillion
to its balance sheet.

92

Overall, the bailout represented the largest absolute increase in US

government debt in history, and the largest proportional debt increase since World War
93

Two.

2.5

Policy Response: Monetary

Expansion
The American government’s monetary response to the crisis was rapid. When interbank
lending initially froze in August 2007, the Federal Reserve injected $24 billion of credit
into the financial sector.

94

The Fed cut interest rates from 5.25% in September of 2007 to

2% in April 2008, and finally to .25% by September of 2008.

95

While this did help ease

the pressure on financial institutions, it also caused the dollar to depreciate and the price
of oil to rise drastically. From August, 2007 to July 2008, oil prices rose from $70 per
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barrel to over $140 per barrel.

96

This caused two secondary shocks to the economy as

gasoline prices increased drastically, driving down automobile sales. Oil prices did
eventually come back down as estimates of global economic growth worsened. However,
the combined rise in oil and other commodity prices resulting from a depreciating dollar
served to prolong the crisis, indirectly affecting such economically important sectors as
the automobile industry.
While the expansionary monetary policy pursued since the financial crisis has helped
corporate borrowing recover from its collapse in 2007-2009, non-corporate businesses
(including most small businesses) actually undertook no net borrowing through Q1
2011.

97

As of summer 2011, the majority of loan requests by non-corporate and small

businesses were being turned down or receiving only partial approval of their requests.
Borrowing rates for these businesses have also remained relatively high, generally over
6%, “even while commercial banks have been able to borrow on the federal funds market
at near-zero rates since the beginning of 2009.”

98

Pollin demonstrates how these

borrowing rates for non-corporate and small businesses have changed little from the mid2000’s, when the federal funds rate varied from roughly 3% to as high as 5.25%.
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Commercial and non-depository financial institutions have thus essentially absorbed the
effects of the lowering of interest rates by the Fed, increasing cash reserves from $20.8
billion in 2007 to $1.4 trillion (10% of GDP) by Q1 2011.

100

While insufficient reserves

were a significant part of the weakness of financial firms which led to the crisis, banks
have now gone in the opposite direction of hording cash while remaining wary of
lending. The benefit of the Fed’s expansionary monetary policy, the provision of
affordable credit, has largely accumulated in large financial institutions while remaining
difficult to access by smaller businesses. Especially concentrated in the construction and
retail industries, these credit market obstacles combined with declining sales have
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continued to provide significant challenges to American businesses and economic
recovery in general.

101

While monetary expansion has helped improve banks’ balance

sheets and thus stabilized business confidence, it has not stimulated the resumption of
economic growth through increased investment as predicted by Keynesian theory.
However, it was still a powerful tool in mitigating the financial crisis and thus
forestalling the economic fallout of a total financial collapse.

2.6

Policy Response: Fiscal Stimulus

The financial crisis saw household wealth plummet with asset values, and households
reasonably reacted to this balance sheet shock by increasing savings. Personal
consumption expenditures in the US account for roughly 70% of GDP, or $10 trillion.
This means that every 1% increase in savings reduces spending, and thus income, by
roughly $100 billion. From December, 2007 to May, 2009 the US savings rate rose by
6.5% from 0.4% to 6.9% - implying a $650 billion reduction in national income.
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This

increase in savings, while making eminent sense at the micro-economic level, generates
massive macro-economic effects on aggregate demand and national incomes. The
Economic Stimulus Act passed in February 2008 sought to distribute over $100 billion in
cash directly to the American people in an attempt to stimulate demand by boosting
household balance sheets. This represented a fiscal rather than monetary response as the
funding was provided by borrowing rather than money creation. This temporary rebate
did not significantly increase spending, however, as consumption and aggregate demand
remained largely unaffected.
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While the majority of policy response to the crisis

through 2008 was monetary in nature, or consisted of targeted bailouts to large firms

104

2009 saw a massive government stimulus program unveiled.
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The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was passed and signed in
February, 2009. Drafted at the urging of the Obama administration, the ARRA was a
direct response to the economic crisis with three immediate goals: mitigate job losses and
stimulate job growth; “Spur economic investment and stimulate long-term growth”;
foster accountability and transparency in government spending.

105

The ARRA allocated

$787 billion (raised to over $840 in the Obama administration’s 2012 budget) of federal
funds into tax credits, government contracts, loans, and entitlements to households and
106

businesses.

So far, the federal stimulus program has allocated $297.8 billion in tax benefits. This
includes over $240 billion to individuals and households; $33.5 billion in tax incentives
for businesses hiring specific demographics such as veterans and 16-24 year-olds; $10.8
billion for energy efficiency improvements to households and businesses; $9.2 billion for
industrial and infrastructure development, education and job training in highunemployment areas; and $3.7 billion for “assistance with continuing health
coverage.”

107

The ARRA allocates a further $231.1 billion in government contracts,

grants and loans for infrastructural investment in education, transportation, energy
efficiency, environmental protection and restoration, housing, technological research, and
health.

108

Finally, the ARRA allocates $224.3 billion to entitlement programs such as

Medicaid/Medicare, unemployment insurance, family services, housing, and energy and
agricultural subsidies.

109

The ARRA represents fiscal stimulus on a titanic scale.

The reaction of economists to this legislation varied according to their perspectives on the
economic role of the state. In January 2009 the CATO institute published an ad in major
American newspapers wherein approximately 200 economists rejected the need for
government spending to stimulate growth. The ad explicitly denied that “all economists
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are now Keynesians” and argued for “reforms that remove impediments to work, savings,
investment and production. Lower tax rates and a reduction in the burden of
government...”

110

Conversely, more statist-minded economists published their own letter

to Congress (also with roughly 200 signatories) urgently advocating adoption of the
ARRA to provide “important investments that can start to overcome the nation’s
damaging loss of jobs... and put the United States back onto a sustainable long-term
growth path.”

111

US federal deficits averaged just 0.8% of GDP under president Clinton and 2% under
President Bush. By comparison, the deficit reached 10% of GDP ($1.4 trillion) in 2009,
8.9% in 2010, and was projected at 10.9% of GDP in 2011.
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This occurred as a result of

the recession itself through falling profits, asset prices, and thus government revenues.
However the sharp deficit increase was also a result of the ARRA. Despite the fears
voiced by fiscal conservatives, the fiscal expansion starting in 2009 did not significantly
raise interest rates on government debt or inflation.

113

The ARRA also did not ‘end’ the

recession in terms of stimulating growth to bring unemployment back down from its
average of around 9%. However, recent research suggests that “the downturn would have
been significantly more severe in the absence of the ARRA.”
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Counterfactual forecasts

by the Congressional Budget Office considered hypothetical developments in the absence
of the ARRA, which it found to have contributed to GDP and mitigated unemployment
from 2009-2011. The positive effects of ARRA were simply “too modest relative to the
impacts of the financial collapse and great recession.”

115

Both monetary and fiscal

expansion mitigated the amplitude of the recession, in accordance with Keynesian
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assumptions. However, the scale of economic crisis due to the titanic collapse in financial
markets prevented these measure from overcoming such a massive market correction.

2.7

Analysis

The period from 1985-2007 saw a convergence in the field of economic theory that
monetary policy was all that was needed to prevent another Depression. “Governments
believed that low inflation and interest rates were the ultimate instruments of a free
market economy to sustain growth without suffering from booms and bursts, let alone a
116

crisis.”

Investors overlooked the housing bubble partially because it was obscured by

low interest rates, but industry leaders like Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan also likely
would not have relished acknowledging its role in their successfully ending the 2001
recession.

117

The Federal Reserve typically responds to recessions by lowering interest

rates to encourage lending and thus spending and consumption. In the downturn of 1990
interest rates were lowered from 9% to 3%, during the 2001 recession they went from
6.5% to 1%, and in 2008 interest rates were lowered from 5.25% to almost 0%.
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The efficacy of monetary policy is inherently limited, as interest rates cannot go below
0%, and the only time they have been so low in the past was during the Great
Depression.

119

This underscores Keynes’ insight into the need for government spending

through fiscal policy when monetary policy options have been exhausted. When the
private sector refuses to spend, the public sector must step in.
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Massive fiscal and

monetary stimulus were employed by the US government and did dampen the economic
shock resulting from the financial crisis. However, the crisis itself was of such a scale
that no response could reasonably have been expected to completely counteract its
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effects. There was simply no “policy silver bullet that could have been expected to
contain the crisis.”

121

Preventing such financial crises is thus the only remedy to the

economic crises they induce.
Fannie and Freddie’s status as GSE’s implied a government guarantee of their solvency.
However, this obligation was not represented in the budget and so its risk went largely
unmanaged. Federal guarantees do not eliminate risk, they simply shift it from investors
onto taxpayers, with governments unlikely to attempt to control or price this risk while
simultaneously denying that a guarantee exists.
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The implied federal guarantee of

Fannie and Freddie served as an indirect subsidy by reducing the burden of risk
compensation from the GSE’s to investors, who were willing to buy even from nearinsolvent GSE’s because the ultimate issuer of debt-based securities is seen to be the US
Treasury. In lieu of paying the government for this privilege, Fannie and Freddie were
tasked with providing credit to “underserved markets”.

123

These GSE’s produced large

profits for shareholders because their borrowing and lending privileges allowed higher
net income than for comparable private financial institutions. When private institutions
did enter the market for these artificially low-risk securities, they profited from the
established market ‘wisdom’ of artificially low mortgage default risk. Private entrance
into mortgage securitization thus expanded the ultimate risk exposure of government. In
the American case then, the implied guarantee thus became a form of corporate subsidy,
which did not appear in the budget because it would only be paid in the event of market
failure.
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The US government enlisted the private financial sector to facilitate government
financing by securitizing and marketing mortgage risk. Beyond moral hazard is the
problem of ‘regulatory capture’ of government institutions by organizations they are
supposed to oversee. The Fed faces a potential conflict of interest as the lender of last
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resort to banks and emergency provider of liquidity, as it bears the responsibility of
125

rescuing banks ‘too big to fail’ which are affected by interest rates which it controls.

While broader government oversight of financial firms is clearly in order, the role of the
Fed in monetary policy is important. Widening the range of stakeholders with an interest
in capturing Fed policy not only creates conflicts of interest but also bears the serious
ramifications of an increasingly politicized monetary policy.

126

As the main agent of

policy response to the crisis until September 2008, the Fed focused on its legal mandate
as lender of last resort and protector of banks against collapse.
The American case illustrates the multiple roles of informational asymmetry in
generating the financial crisis. A decades-long policy of subsidizing low-income housing
off-balance sheet culminated in a real estate asset bubble, with taxpayers ultimately liable
when the bubble burst. This hidden subsidy, paid only in the event of market failure,
fueled the bubble by making the real estate and associated securities markets appear
artificially profitable through the discount borrowing available to Fannie and Freddie.
The financial industry’s political influence allowed private firms to enter the subprime
market on a roughly equal footing to the GSE’s and fuel this bubble by carrying assets
and liabilities off-balance sheet. This was overlooked by government regulators eager to
end the recession of 2000-2001, and amplified by the associated long period of low
interest rates from 2001-2004.
The unregulated ‘shadow banking’ sector in over-the-counter securities meant that once
underlying asset values began to fall, the opacity of counterparty risk led all financial
institutions to restrict lending regardless of the quality of potential borrowers. Finally, the
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the vagueness of the initial response in the form of
TARP exacerbated this systemic uncertainty, sending financial markets into a tailspin,
which spread globally through transnational financial networks. Failures occurred on the
part of regulators, legislators, corporate leadership, and individual borrowers who could
not afford their mortgages in the long term. However, it was the lack of systemic
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informational transparency which encouraged each of these actors to pursue short-term
advantage while assuming the others were acting in good faith. The American case
illustrates that monetary and fiscal stimulus are useful policy tools for combating
recession. The scale and financial nature of the crisis, however, required additional tools
in the form of financial interventions to subdue market fears of contagion and systemic
risk. The rapid deregulation, consolidation, and growth of the financial sector was the
necessary condition for generating the systemic risk which induced the crisis in the first
place.

3
3.1

ICELAND
Introduction

Iceland represents an extreme example of how deregulation and financial innovation can
lead to systemic risks “which may seem obvious after they occur but can have
devastating effects on nations in which policy makers are still in the learning process.”

127

During his fourteen-year period in office from 1991-2004, Prime Minister David
Oddsson’s government pursued a strongly neoliberal program of economic deregulation
and privatization. Despite generating a large trade deficit and increasing foreign debt,
these reforms were met with both domestic and international approval as a means of
stimulating rapid economic growth. In 2007 Iceland’s average annual income was 1.6
times that in the US at $70,000, studies showed Icelanders to be the happiest people in
the world, and the Icelandic government tied with New Zealand and Finland as the
world’s least corrupt public administration.
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Icelandic stock market values had

increased by a factor of nine from 2001 to 2007, and the current account deficit was the
highest in the world at 24% of GDP. Moreover, Iceland’s three main banks had increased
their asset values by almost nine times total GDP, far outpacing the Central Bank’s
ability to act as a lender of last resort.
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The IMF, along with foreign and domestic economists, had issued warnings that this was
an unsustainable model. However Iceland’s finance ministry, Central Bank (CBI), and
Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) allowed citizens to continue to borrow to excess.
The government, along with the Chamber of Commerce, touted Iceland as a successful
exception to the rules of fiscal and monetary prudence.

130

By the end of 2008 the

country’s three big banks had collapsed, along with the currency, and been taken over by
the government. Iceland’s financial meltdown was the most severe and complete of any
Western country in the global financial crisis.

131

In January 2009, Iceland’s government

became the first to resign as a result of the global financial crisis.

132

Iceland’s Conservative party largely blamed the crisis on exogenous factors stemming
from the American financial meltdown and, to a lesser extent, its repercussions in Britain.
However it has been argued that the extreme form of leveraging by Icelandic bankers,
and concomitant failure of Iceland’s financial regulators, made a meltdown likely to
occur in the face of “any of many events.”

133

Iceland’s three main banks were allowed to

grow far larger than the capacity of the Central Bank to act as lender of last resort, or for
Iceland’s tiny economy and tax base to allow their recapitalization in the case of
emergency. This occurred as the banks were deregulated and their new managers turned
their traditional role as savings and loan institutions into a capital base for leveraged,
speculative investment.
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Iceland’s case thus also demonstrates the role of lax regulatory

oversight in allowing the buildup of systemic risk. It also demonstrates the procyclical
nature of bank failures in driving market panic when the government is unwilling, or in
the Icelandic case unable, to intervene to stabilize the financial sector. This case also
shows how monetary and fiscal policy responses are constrained by the size of financial
crisis in proportion to the economy as a whole.

130

Wade, “Iceland as Icarus,” 7.
Throstur Olaf Sigurjonsson and Mar Wolfgang Mixa, “Learning from the ‘Worst Behaved’: Iceland’s
Financial Crisis and the Nordic Comparison,” Thunderbird International Business Review 53 no. 2 (2011):
210.
132
Wade, “Iceland as Icarus,” 7.
133
Wade, “Iceland as Icarus,” 14.
134
Wade, “Iceland as Icarus,” 15.
131

34

3.2

Financial Regulation

Upon accession to the European economic area in 1994 and the loosening of restrictions
on cross-border economic flows, the Oddsson government began a program of state asset
privatization and labour deregulation.

135

In fairness to reformers, Iceland had been a

“terminally sick socialist economy” when Oddsson came to power in 1991.

136

Ponderous

and inefficient state institutions, a large budget deficit, and high inflation had hobbled
Iceland’s economy through the 1980’s. Beginning in 1998, the two large public banks
were privatized in a process closed to foreign bidders, which saw Landsbanki acquired
mainly by major figures in the conservative (Independence) party. The second main bank,
Kaupthing, was allocated to prominent members of Independence’s coalition partner, the
Centre Party.

137

Iceland’s third major bank, Glitnir, was later created from the merger of

several smaller banks and dominated by private business interests with little affiliation
with the traditional ruling parties. The new owners of these three banks also set up private
equity companies which purchased further holdings in the banks. Iceland’s financial
system was now intensely concentrated, directed by a handful of politically connected
owners with little “experience in national, let alone international, finance.”
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The privatization of Iceland’s banks transformed executive compensation policy into “an
aggressive investment banking-style incentive system,” which encouraged greater risktaking.

139

Icelandic bank owners and management undertook a deliberate policy of

borrowing from their own banks to purchase shares in their own, and their competitors’,
institutions in order to drive up both firms’ share prices without any actual added
capital.

140

From 2003 all three major banks began acquiring financial services firms in

Scandinavia and Northern Europe. Overseas proxy companies were also established in
places like Luxembourg and the British Virgin Islands to further purchase shares in
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Icelandic banks. By the end of 2007 Icelandic banking firms owned 56 “overseas
operating units” in 21 countries.

141

Before the 1990’s, Iceland was characterised by extensive state intervention in the
economy. Commercial banks especially were typically aligned with one of the two main
political parties: the Conservative (Independence) Party, which generally represented
urban commercial and fishing interests, and; the smaller Centre Party, representing the
countryside and cooperatives.

142

During privatization in the 1990’s and 2000’s the main

banks were “bought by friends of the main parties, with no experience of modern
banking. No foreign ownership was sought.”

143

Iceland’s lax financial regulations helped

generate both the country’s economic boom and the eventual meltdown. Iceland’s
regulators in fact had little specialized knowledge of international banking, and over time
the government came to rely on the banks themselves for economic information.

144

Low taxes and weak oversight by the FSA both fueled profits and encouraged their use
for further speculation. Capital reserve levels required by the Central Bank were lowered
during the boom of the early 2000’s. After the crisis, it would become known that the
Central Bank maintained these low requirements in response to pressure from the banks
145

themselves.

The private equity companies with which the banks did business (and by

which they were eventually largely owned) also played a serious role. Grouped into
holding companies with just a few owners, these investment firms bought shares from the
main banks at inflated prices using only the shares themselves as collateral. Through
these “dubious and possibly fraudulent activities,” this “new capital” would appear to
strengthen both firms’ balance sheets.
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While banks’ occasionally bordered on fraud, their activities were for the most part legal.
The wider systemic failure thus not only resulted from the actions of bankers but from the
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inaction of regulators at the FSA and Central Bank. In fairness, the FSA was designed to
manage retail banking and was under-resourced and understaffed considering the
growing challenges it faced. The regulator did publish some criticisms of cross-holdings,
lack of transparency, and other issues through 2006-2007. What actions the FSA did
undertake were generally stifled through either political channels or private litigation.

147

Regulatory capture was “endemic” to the financial system: the prospectus for Icesave’s
Dutch opening contained attestations to the strength of Iceland’s financial system by the
Chairman of the FSA himself.

148

Hobbled as it was by logistical and political barriers,

the FSA simply did not make a genuine effort to determine the accuracy of balance sheets
at major banks and equity firms.

149

Financial institution stress tests, passed by all three

major Icelandic banks just weeks prior to the collapse, “did not account for vulnerability
to either a liquidity or currency crisis.”

150

The chair of the board of governors at the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) at this time was
none other than David Oddsson, the former prime minister who had overseen the
privatization of Icelandic banking in his tenure as prime minister from 1991-2004.
Known for being domineering and manipulative, Oddsson was appointed governor by his
protégé, Prime Minister Geir Haarde, who would eventually resign along with his
government in January, 2009.

151

Oddsson “has not lived outside Iceland, has no

background in monetary economics, and understands little about international
finance.”

152

Legislation passed in 2000 reduced the supervisory role of the Central Bank:

it would now merely set interest rates while banks were allowed to finance operations
through overseas borrowing rather than deposits.

153

The few public bodies critical of Iceland’s financial governance were not listened to, and
in some cases silenced. In 2002 Oddsson dismantled the National Economic Institute,
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which reported directly to the Prime Minister’s office, after it published reports of drastic
economic mismanagement.

154

The University of Iceland was pressured to fund its

Economic and Social Research Centres privately, and these bodies published much less
critical national studies once they depended on commissioned research. It has also been
suggested that Iceland’s public data agency, Statistics Iceland, was bullied into
downplaying information on growing wealth and income inequality.

155

Regulatory

capture and corruption thus figure prominently into the narrative of Iceland’s financial
expansion and subsequent implosion.

3.3

Housing and Financial Asset Bubble

In 2004 Iceland’s banks began offering mortgages at rates competitive with the
government-run mortgage provider, the Housing Financing Fund (HFF). This is similar
to the way private American financial firms joined Fannie and Freddie in the sub-prime
mortgage business at the same time. Deregulation combined with the accumulation of
foreign exchange reserves by the CBI provided a liquidity surplus which the banks put
towards asset acquisitions and growth.

156

Kaupthing was the first bank to offer fixed-rate

mortgages in mid-2004. The other major banks began to do likewise, and within a year
Iceland’s private banking sector increased its market share of home mortgages from 5%
157

to 43%.

As in the United States, the private banks’ lower offered rates prompted a

surge in demand from first-time homebuyers and existing home-buyers wishing to
refinance. Combined with a general increase in economic growth and purchasing power,
this real estate boom drove housing prices upward.
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In addition to simply borrowing too much, Iceland’s banks and their cross-owned equity
firms often pursued “ill-considered, overpriced, and sometimes dubious, acquisitions.”
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Often acquired for prestige, many loss-generating businesses continued to be funded by
Icelandic banks and equity companies to avoid the losses and potential bank run their
bankruptcies would induce.

160

Individual households were also encouraged to borrow

beyond their means to a degree that has been characterized as “predatory lending,” and
were also encouraged to convert debt held into lower-interest foreign currencies.

161

The

three big banks’ expanding balance sheets, worth over 800% of GDP by the end of
2007

162

, also translated into higher and higher remunerations for owners and

management. Much of this in turn was channeled into financial contributions to the
governing political parties.

163

In July 2006 an IMF report warned that the rapid expansion of Icelandic banks’ assets
and liabilities was a cause for concern and a source of vulnerability, by which time
government deficits had already quadrupled to 20% of GDP since 2003.

164

Fitch

downgraded Iceland’s outlook from stable to negative in February 2006, triggering a
“mini-crisis” in which the Króna lost roughly 25% of its value.
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This caused bank

liabilities, many of which were denominated in foreign currencies, to increase. At this
point “the sustainability of foreign currency debts became a ‘public’ problem, the stock
market fell and business defaults rose.”
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The raising of interest rates by the Japanese

Central Bank in July 2006 hit Icelandic financial firms hard, disrupting the international
“carry trade” business of borrowing low-interest yen to invest in higher-yield currencies
such as the Króna. Iceland’s currency fell 12% against the US dollar while Icelandic
stock markets lost 20% of their value.
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Iceland’s financial and political elite chided foreign critics. The Central Bank borrowed
money in order to double foreign exchange reserves. The Chamber of commerce
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commissioned reports from leading American and British economists, who were paid
handsomely for their healthy prognoses of Iceland’s financial state.

168

By autumn

Iceland’s banks were having difficulty raising money by selling bonds, as international
markets became wary of their rapidly expanding balance sheets.
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Rather than take these financing problems as a warning the banks turned to international
money markets to raise capital, opening internet accounts and offering high-interest retail
banking to British and Dutch depositors. Because these operations were opened as
branches and not subsidiaries, they were subject to regulation by the FSA rather than by
British or Dutch authorities. Host country regulators only concerned themselves with
branches’ liquid capital, not their assets, while the FSA virtually ignored these offshore
operations “even as they incurred giant liabilities against the Icelandic deposit insurance
scheme and ultimately against Icelandic taxpayers.”

170

Over a period of 18 months,

Landsbanki and Kaupthing collected a combined £4.8 billion and €2.9 billion from
British and Dutch investors through their Icesave and Edge internet deposit services.
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As in the US, the Icelandic banks’ rapidly-growing loans and assets were financed
through short-term debt. Moreover, the high interest rate set by the Central Bank both
attracted foreign investment while driving citizens to borrow from overseas institutions in
lower-interest denominations. Foreign investors benefited not only from the rapid
inflation of the Króna, and counted on the fact that interest rates were unlikely to be
lowered as the resulting depreciation “would raise the already heavy burden of foreign
currency debt of households and firms.”
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Short-term foreign debt outweighed the

foreign exchange reserves, with which it might be paid, by a factor of 10 by 2007.

168

173

Wade and sigurgeirsdottir, “Lessons from Iceland,”16-17.
Wade, “Iceland as Icarus,” 18.
170
Wade, “Iceland as Icarus,” 18.
171
Sigurjonsson and Mixa, 211; The British figure has been place as high as £8 billion by Hine and
Ashman. Hine and Ashman, “Iceland’s Banking Sector and the Political Economy of Crisis,” 554.
172
Wade, “Iceland as Icarus,” 16.
173
Wade, “Iceland as Icarus,” 17.
169

By

40

this time household debt equaled 103% of GDP, while gross foreign debt stood between
700-800% of GDP.
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Despite the positive public relations, even the senior levels of Iceland’s government were
growing concerned at what lay behind the banks’ balance sheets. In mid-2007 an ad-hoc
coordination group was formed to facilitate information sharing and contingency
planning should a financial crisis erupt. The group consisted of “officials from the Prime
Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Banking and Commerce, the
Central Bank and the Financial Supervisory Authority of Iceland (FME).”

175

The group

proved superficial, providing little real planning and reporting so ineffectively that
government ministers were later able to avoid legal responsibility by pleading ignorance
of the severity of the danger.
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After the mini-crisis of 2006, Icelandic banks sought new forms of short-term financing
for their liabilities. One was the creation high-interest retail banking internet services
catering to foreign depositors. Landsbanki pioneered this move with the opening of
Icesave, which opened in the UK in 2006 and the Netherlands in 2008. This was
immensely successful, attracting deposits from even public and academic institutions in
the UK, and generating the necessary capital for Landsbanki to refinance its liabilities
while acquiring even more assets.
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In response to Icesave’s manifest success, Glitnir

and Kaupthing followed suit by setting up their own internet deposit services.
A second means of refinancing was through a program by which the three national banks
issued debt securities to smaller regional banks, which then borrowed against these
securities from the Central Bank without needing to provide additional collateral. The
smaller banks would then use these loans in turn to lend to the “Big Three,” allowing
them to indirectly borrow beyond even the generous limits imposed by the Central
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Bank.

178

They also set up subsidiaries in Luxembourg which performed a similar

function by borrowing from the Central Bank of Luxembourg and the European Central
Bank. That Iceland’s banks were provided loans using other Icelandic banks’ debts as
collateral owes as much to a lack of prudential oversight by the Icelandic and continental
Central Banks.
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This is especially true as throughout 2008 the Haarde government, and

the Icelandic Central Bank under Oddsson, ignored alternately stern and desperate
warnings from the IMF, British, and Scandinavian Central Banks to scale down the
banking system.

180

More so than in the US case, the hubris of Icelandic bankers and

borrowers can be attributed to inexperience. However the small, closed, and corrupt
nature of Iceland’s political and financial elite allowed them to ignore the warnings of
those more knowledgeable than themselves.

3.4

Financial Crisis

The financial crisis hit Iceland along with many other economies following the collapse
of Lehman Brothers’ at the end of September 2008.

181

The revelation that a major

financial firm might be allowed to fail without government intervention froze interbank
and international money markets, evaporating liquidity and making assets
“untradeable.”

182

In the ensuing market panic, investors fled Iceland’s vulnerable and

overleveraged financial system en masse. As short-run funding dried up, Iceland’s banks
quickly slid into insolvency. Faced with a scheduled €750 million payment on October
15, Glitnir requested an emergency loan from the Central Bank. This request was rejected
and was met instead with an offer to inject €600 million into the bank in exchange for a
75% ownership stake.
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Glitnir was taken over by the government on October 6,
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Landsbanki on October 7. Despite an 80 billion ISK loan from the government,
Kaupthing finally collapsed on October 9.

184

Iceland’s stock markets lost roughly 98% of their value in 2008. In September of that
year the government refused to bail out, and instead took over, Glitnir bank. Within a
week the other two major Icelandic banks, Landsbanki and Kaupthing, also collapsed and
had to be nationalised.

185

The Icelandic Króna (ISK) had fallen from 1/70 euro to 1/190

euro by November 2008, and average income fell from 1.6 to 0.8 times that of the US
from 2007 to February 2009. The IMF offered a $2.5 billion loan to help stabilize the
Króna, an offer matched by other Nordic banks.

186

Unlike the much larger US and UK,

Iceland’s bank losses far outweighed the government’s ability to absorb the cost of
bailing out private institutions.
On September 29, 2008 Glitnir appealed for Central Bank assistance, and Oddsson
agreed to buy 75% of Glitnir’s shares in an attempt to restore confidence. Rather than
boost confidence in the bank, this seriously damaged confidence in the Iceland itself as
“the country’s rating plunged, and credit lines were withdrawn from Landsbanki and
Kaupthing.”

187

At this point Oddsson attempted to peg the Króna while cutting interest

rates. The peg lasted only a few hours, after which point the Króna’s value plummeted.
On October 8 UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown froze Landsbanki’s UK assets under
anti-terrorism laws. Soon the IMF stepped in, offering a conditional loan of $2.1 billion
to stabilize the Króna, to which the Nordic Central Banks added a conditional loan of
188

$2.5 billion.

Iceland’s failed experiment with financial liberalization ended essentially

in its placement in conservatorship under its largest trading partners and the IMF.
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3.5

Policy Response: Monetary Policy

After the collapse of Glitnir, David Oddsson made televised statements renouncing any
government responsibility to repay foreign depositors in Icelandic banks which further
escalated international panic. Oddsson “then announced that Russia would provide a
large loan, which the Russian government promptly denied.”

189

At this point Oddsson

announced that the Króna would be pegged to the euro, without even consulting his own
chief economist. This policy lasted less than a day, as Iceland had almost no foreign
exchange reserves left and no capital controls.

190

The short-lived currency peg did,

however, allow government and financial insiders “to spirit their money out of the Króna
at a much more favourable rate than they would get later.”

191

As the crisis became

apparent, Oddsson’s erratic responses did little to calm markets. The Central Bank cut the
interest rate to 12% on October 7, before raising it to 18% thirteen days later.

192

Beyond the influence of Oddsson himself, it is also true that Iceland’s Central Bank was
largely insulated from those of other countries, even Nordic countries. Central Bank
management and staff had few personal connections to their foreign counterparts. Most
were trained in Iceland or the US, and many harboured a combination of nationalistic
193

pride and insecurity in dealing with their larger institutional cousins in Europe.

Management was thus largely unaware “that Icelandic banking had developed a bad
reputation in the other Nordic countries.”

194

When the US and Nordic Central Banks

concluded a currency swap agreement in September, 2008, Icelanders had been shocked
to be excluded.
The small and isolated nature of Iceland’s political and economic authorities prevented
any real international coordination either to prevent or respond to the financial meltdown.
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While the monetary response was erratic and did not help matters, the scale of the crisis
was such that no domestic response could realistically have prevented a complete
meltdown. Since defaulting on its debts, Iceland’s Central Bank has lowered interest rates
to under 6%, maintaining the lower value of the currency and helping to renew economic
growth.

195

This resumption of growth has been bolstered by high global commodity

prices.

3.6

Policy Response: Fiscal Policy

The period of privatization and deregulation also saw major tax cuts on business and
financial earnings, however taxes on low- and medium-income saw major increases. This
shift in the tax burden saw government revenues increase from 39% to 49% of GDP from
1995-2006, which was “wrongly hailed as proof of the proposition dear to supply-side
economics that tax cuts on business increase tax revenues.”

196

This shift in the tax burden

not only encouraged the rapid growth and overleveraging of firms, it also made
government revenues much more dependent on individual households. The financial
crisis and currency collapse decimated household finances while increasing
unemployment, with associated rises in cost to the state welfare system. Even before the
crisis, government deficits had quadrupled to 20% of GDP from 2003-2006.
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With

dwindling revenues and mounting liabilities, Iceland’s government had very little room to
manoeuvre in terms of fiscal response.
Iceland’s government was thus given little choice as to much of the spending it undertook
in the aftermath of the meltdown. Much of the IMF loan was conditioned on repayment
of the debt generated by Icesave to the Dutch and British governments. This repayment,
however, was defeated by Iceland’s citizens in a referendum. Iceland’s recent successful
bond issue in June 2011 seems to have somewhat disproved the IMF’s threat that, should
Iceland default on these British and Dutch deposits, it would never again be able to
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borrow internationally.

198

Icelanders were also expected to repay the exorbitant loan

taken out by the Central Bank in 2006. The now insolvent Central Bank was recapitalized
using public funds equivalent to 18% of GDP, necessitating “cuts in public spending on
health, education and infrastructure.”

3.7

199

Analysis

Iceland’s meltdown demonstrates the need for strengthening cross-border banking
oversight and deposit insurance. Loopholes in EU deposit insurance legislation were
exposed through the exploitation of cross-border accounts and the different treatment of
branches and subsidiaries.

200

This reiterates the importance of informational

transparency, and coordination among financial firms and regulators at the national and
international level, in preventing arbitrage and the buildup of systemic risk. Wade also
argues that the largest commercial banks should continue to be publicly owned post-crisis
due to the “large public-good element” in their function.

201

The case of Iceland demonstrates an abdication of responsibility by individuals and the
importance of accountability. The Special Investigation Commission on the causes of the
crisis report of April 2010 accused ministers in government (including Haarde), former
Central Bank governors, and the director of the FSA of gross negligence.

202

The

Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Finance was also fired for selling his holdings in
one of the major banks immediately before the collapse.

203

The combination of banker

malfeasance and regulatory negligence in Iceland has close parallels in the financial crisis
narratives of the US and UK. Iceland’s meltdown had stronger repercussions for the
country’s population simply because the financial bubble was so much larger in
proportion to the overall economy.
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The scale of the financial crisis relative to Iceland’s economy precluded effective
monetary or fiscal policy responses – Icelanders’ only choice was to start over. Finally,
Iceland’s financial collapse demonstrates the drastic need for informational transparency
in markets. When the financial bubble began to grow in 2003-2004 critical reports were
being published even by the Central Bank, at which point Oddsson was put in charge.
From 2006 to 2008 foreign criticism, especially from the IMF, grew muted just as the
situation was becoming most volatile. This was based on the belief that “the situation had
become so fragile that to speak of it might trigger a run on the banks which might
otherwise be averted.”

204

Despite the essential freeze in government economic policy and the reformation of
Iceland’s banks back into local retail operations (using the remaining ‘good’ assets from
the three former large banks), recovery seems to have begun. Unemployment has
stabilized around 6% from its average high of 8% from 2009-2010; GDP growth returned
to above 2% in 2011 from a low of -7% in 2009 and a still-unpleasant -4% in 2010, and;
inflation sank to about 2.8% in 2011, down from 5% in 2010 and a high of 13% in
2008.

205

Iceland seems to have avoided serious punishment for defaulting on its

creditors, and it has been suggested that this could provide a model for other indebted
European countries. There are problems with this, however.
The first problem is that the indebted Eurozone economies do not have their own
currencies, and so their banks’ collapse will not allow a similar fall in exchange rates to
stimulate exports as has occurred in Iceland.

206

Furthermore, Iceland’s status as a small

peripheral economy means that it’s default, while upsetting some sovereign investors
such as the British and Dutch, did not significantly contribute to global market instability
as might a default by the US or UK. Even smaller eurozone countries such as Greece,
should they be forced to leave the shared currency in the event of default, could trigger an
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unraveling of the euro with drastic global consequences. To draw a parallel between
countries and private financial institutions, Iceland was largely able to default on its
obligations because, unlike the other case studies in this paper, it was not too big to fail.
Finally, Icelanders may have only postponed their reckoning. Households are still highly
indebted, especially those whose internationally-denominated loans increased as the
exchange rate fell. Should defaults on these debts increase, as seems likely, Iceland could
well face another debt crisis.

207

Iceland’s total financial collapse left little leeway for government monetary or fiscal
policy to mitigate the damage. The short-sighted attempt at a currency peg and
fluctuating interest rates at the CBI initially added to the panicked flight of capital out of
the country. Shortly thereafter the Central Bank came under the close oversight of the
IMF, which placed tight capital controls on the country’s economy and took over most
policy decisions at the Central Bank. Capital flight from the Króna, and the lowering of
interest rates post-crisis, have allowed a devaluation of the currency and a return to
export-led growth. This underlines the usefulness of monetary expansion to combat event
the worst economic contractions. Fiscal policy was also largely restricted in the wake of
the crisis due to the cost of recapitalizing the central bank. Reduced revenues through the
recession which followed the crisis and the attendant rise in social welfare costs added to
the fiscal restrictions facing Iceland’s government.
The government decision not to bail out the banks represents a major diversion from the
paths taken by other states, although it was largely predetermined by the incapacity of
Iceland’s small economy and tax base to afford such action. Moreover, the default on
international creditors is still a point of tension in relations with countries such as the UK,
and may yet create serious repercussions for the Icelandic economy. The apparently
(relatively) positive effects of Iceland’s monetary and fiscal responses are thus still
uncertain, and at any rate the responses themselves were likely only feasible due to
Iceland’s small and peripheral economic position. In terms of the onset of crisis,
monetary and fiscal profligacy encouraged the growth of asset bubbles. The initial
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deregulation and opening of Iceland’s financial system, especially the lifting of
restrictions separating retail and investment banking, were necessary conditions which
allowed these imbalances in the first place. The patronage, inexperience, concentrated
ownership, and public-private collusion in Iceland’s financial system used the space
allowed by deregulation to fuel Iceland’s unsustainable financial expansion – and
eventual collapse.

4

UNITED KINGDOM

Considering it’s vulnerabilities as a global financial centre, the UK economy has been
argued by some to have fared relatively well in that it performed “better than most
observers expected,”

208

roughly on par with other large industrialized economies.

209

Despite exceeding worst-case scenarios, the UK is still in difficult economic shape: GDP
growth in 2011 averaged a meagre 1.1%, down from 1.4% in 2010, and fell back into
recession in Q1 2012; unemployment has continued to rise, from 7.8% in 2010 to 7.9% in
2011, and; the public budget deficit in 2011 was estimated at 8.8% of GDP while gross
public debt stood at 79.5% of GDP, up from 76.1% in 2010.

210

Through the mid-2000’s the economy of the United Kingdom appeared very stable.
Unemployment was holding at around 5%, the lowest rate since the 1970’s. GDP growth
was historically average and inflation maintained near the 2% target.

211

While an

inflationary boom did not seem likely, there was concern about the rapid rise in house
prices, the similarly rapid expansion of credit, and the growth of the financial system in
general. The growing interdependence of global finance and the potentially increased
vulnerability of the UK and other economies to foreign financial shocks, however, had
not yet become a widely held source of concern.
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In terms of financial linkages, the UK
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was a central nexus in global banking. Financial and business services accounted for 30%
of GDP in the UK.

213

Thus, “despite low public debt, the government had therefore large

implicit banking sector liabilities like Iceland, Ireland and Switzerland.

214

As elsewhere,

the run-up to the crisis saw real estate lending take on a much greater proportion of
banks’ balance sheets. This created the risk that a decline in property values could have
considerable effects on banks solvency.

215

The UK case reiterates the growing themes of monetary expansion and financial
interventions to stabilize the banking sector during a financial crisis. The lower UK
growth following the pursuit of spending cuts, as compared with the US, also suggests
that fiscal stimulus is preferable during a recession. The procyclicality of austerity in
prolonging recessions gains credence here, and reinforces the Keynesian belief that debt
repayment is most appropriate once economic growth and private demand have resumed.
As elsewhere, an effective regulatory regime ensuring risk transparency is seen as crucial
in preventing the buildup of systemic risk which triggered the financial crisis.

4.1

Financial Regulation

The rapid growth of debt-to-deposit ratios in UK banks in the early 2000’s were a result
of weakening regulation and the rise of securitisation.

216

Regulatory oversight of British

banks in the lead-up to the crisis has been criticized along lines that are by now familiar.
In the case of the UK, such criticism has emphasized a defective deposit insurance
regime, the lack of an adequate legal framework for the resolution of insolvent banks, and
(as in the United States) lax regulatory oversight.

217

Northern Rock was the first major

bank failure in the UK, a ‘canary in the coal mine’ warning of the overall vulnerability of
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the financial sector, similar to Bear Stearns in the US. The Financial Services Authority
(FSA) failed to properly evaluate Northern Rock’s business model, its rapid growth, and
their associated risks. It also failed to communicate what concerns it did have to the
Northern Rock board.

218

Similar criticisms regarding weak regulatory oversight include

insufficient capital requirements (especially in trading), regulations on liquidity, and
controls on executive bonuses.

219

The FSA review of financial regulation published in March, 2009 (the “Turner Review”)
recommended: extended jurisdiction of bank regulation, including oversight of capital
adequacy and credit rating agencies; codified remuneration frameworks to discourage
excessive risk-taking; centralized clearance of CDS trading to improve systemic
transparency, and; closer coordination and regulation of cross-border banking.

220

The

British regulatory regime failed to ensure capital buffers kept up with the expansion of
credit, gradually leading to an erosion of sufficient liquidity in individual institutions and
the financial system as a whole.
change in financial regulation.

221

222

As in the US there is strong consensus on the need for

Also like the United States, the regulatory failure in the

UK is not solely one of insufficient regulatory legislation, but also of the executors of the
UK regulatory regime to exercise their existing legal powers.
The regulatory shortcomings in the UK which contributed to the financial crisis reflect
not simply a failure of the formal regulatory framework, but a gradually-developed laxity
in regulatory culture. British regulatory authorities are in fact mandated with broad
powers.

223

The poor performance of the UK’s tripartite regulatory regime - comprising

the FSA, the Bank of England, and the Treasury – thus has as much to do with
performance accountability as it does with an effective legal regulatory framework.
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From 1997 to 2010, the Treasury has been responsible for overall regulatory policy
framework, the Bank of England for financial stability, and the FSA for prudential
supervision.

224

The Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority report to

Parliament and are subject to scrutiny by the Treasury Select Committee.
In June 2010 the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer announced reforms intended to couple
monetary policy with its private counterpart in the financial industry. These reforms
would abolish the shared oversight responsibility of the FSA, Bank of England, and UK
Treasury as well as dismantle the FSA itself. Under the proposed reforms, the Bank of
England will establish a Financial Policy Committee (FPC), chaired by the BoE
governor, to conduct macro-prudential analysis and oversight.

225

Since mid-2009, risk

premia for UK banks have largely returned to their pre-crisis levels, indicating that
expectations regarding British banks’ future performance has stabilized. While overall
lending among UK banks has not returned to pre-crisis levels, the recovery has in large
part been stimulated by the return of lending to businesses, and “the most severe
constraints on access to finance were short-lived.”

226

It has been argued that government

guarantees of financial institutions have “undoubtedly underpinned” the return of
confidence to the UK Banking system.

227

The UK government seems to have taken the lesson that the high debt-to-asset leveraging
inherent in financial capitalism requires capital protection on the scale that only
governments can access.

228

In exchange for this protection, the UK government is

attempting to expand its oversight of financial services. For example, government will
now undertake “micro-economic decisions such as regulating speculation in mortgages,”

224

MacNeil is careful to point out that the financial stability mandate of the Bank is separate from its
monetary policy role, in which it is formally independent of the government. MacNeil, “The Trajectory of
Regulatory Reform in the UK,” 491.
225
Kay, “UK Monetary Policy Change,” 156; MacNeil, “The Trajectory of Regulatory Reform in the UK,”
492.
226
Sentance et al., “How the UK Economy Weathered the Financial Storm,” 113.
227
Sentance et al., “How the UK Economy Weathered the Financial Storm,” 112.
228
Kay, “UK Monetary Policy Change,” 157.

52

issues which were previously left up to markets.

229

The Supervisory Enhancement

Programme is an attempt to change the regulatory model that is more “intrusive and
direct” than the “light touch” model unofficially subscribed to prior to the crisis.

230

The

Financial Services Bill is currently before Parliament, and is set to move on to the House
of Lords after its third reading in the House of Commons on May 22, 2012.

4.2

231

Housing and Financial Asset Bubble

The failure of Northern Rock in September 2007 was an initial warning of the
weaknesses in the UK financial sector. After converting to a stock bank in 1997,
Northern Rock had grown from 6% of the UK mortgage market in 1999 to 19% in 2007,
232

with assets doubling from $16 billion to $32 billion from mid-2005 to end-2007.

Northern Rock originated mortgages of low credit-quality and packaged them into
securities to be resold. In the meantime these mortgages were ‘warehoused’ and funded
through short-term money market liabilities. The risk-prone business model at Northern
Rock, which dealt primarily in mortgage loans, depended more heavily on short-term
interbank financing than that of most British banks. This business model also saw the
bank making larger loans as a proportion of property and borrowers’ income, making
Northern Rock that much more dependent on the maintenance and continued increase of
property values.

233

The run on the bank’s funding liabilities, rather than depositor

withdrawals, reflects the exposure of UK banks to global liquidity shortages due to their
dependence on short-term financing of liabilities. At the time of the crisis’ full onset,
“roughly 70% of UK banks funding was at less than one-year maturity.”
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The UK was hit along with the rest of the financial world by the shutdown of interbank
lending in mid-August, 2007. Despite being considered well-run and well-capitalized by
the FSA in 2007, by September Northern Rock faced severe difficulty rolling over its
short-term financing obligations.

235

On September 13, 2007, news broke that the Bank of

England had made a deal to bail out Northern Rock. By the next day depositors and
investors were flocking to withdraw their money from Northern Rock in Britain’s first
bank run since 1866, which only ended when the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced
a government guarantee of the bank’s deposits.

236

Private and public takeovers were

discussed through the winter and in February, 2008 Northern Rock was formally
nationalised. The bank’s annual report in March would subsequently reveal a £167
237

million loss.

HBOS is a British banking and insurance company which grew significantly through
several mergers from 1995 through 2001, during which time it also became a publicly
traded company. Dealing primarily with mortgages, HBOS became an increasingly
aggressive consumer lender through the early 2000’s, covering roughly half of its
liabilities through deposits and the other half through wholesale markets and
securitisation, including repackaging mortgages and trading in CDO’s and CDF’s. By
September 2008 HBOS’s liabilities outstripped internal revenue by £200 billion and
required £20 billion per year to refinance.
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The Royal Bank of Scotland was an even

larger UK bank. RBS was the world’s fifth largest bank at its peak, the tenth largest
company in the world in 2000. From 2004-2009 it was second largest shareholder in the
Bank of China, which itself was the fifth-largest bank in the world by February 2008.
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RBS entered the investment banking field in 2000, becoming a dominant player in
leveraged finance in the UK and Europe. RBS’ Global Banking and Markets division
(GBM) made huge profits trading ABS, MBS and investment-grade corporate bonds. In
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so doing, RBS was “building significant exposure to the activities that were at the heart
of the global banking maelstrom of 2007/8.”

240

By March 2007, GBM was the world’s

second largest issuer of subprime mortgages. Unfortunately for RBS, the financial crisis
began to grow just as it was also pursuing an expensive (at £49 billion) and ill-conceived
takeover of ABM Amro, the Netherlands’ largest bank.

241

British banking closely

paralleled the increase in leveraged MBS investment seen in the US and Iceland, with
similar results when the market for those securities collapsed.

4.3

Financial Crisis

In 1998 the UK’s biggest eight banks lent out less than they held in deposits, whereas by
2008 their loans exceeded deposits by over £500 billion.

242

British Banks’ acquired debt

was also largely in CDO’s which they repackaged into SIV’s (their source of rising
profits) and resold, leaving them extremely exposed to fluctuations in the US housing
market. Through early 2008 weakening house prices and CDS, CDO and MBS (“alphabet
soup”) markets created worries that asset write-downs might leave banks without
sufficient capital.

243

Bank share prices were falling markedly by March, 2008, and in

April banks released profit warnings. HBOS was seen as especially exposed to risk which
drove away investors. The bank’s share price fell from 450 pence in March 2008 to 283
pence by September 12, at which point a run saw it fall to 88 pence in three days.

244

By April 2008 RBS was facing £5.9 billion in lost value from write-downs in toxic asset
values, and attempted to shore up its reserves through rights issues and the selling off of
245

subsidiaries.

By the end of the year losses had risen to roughly £20 billion. Even

without these write-downs, RBS faced trading losses of £7-8 billion in 2008. Altogether,
RBS lost £28 billion in 2008, the largest annual corporate loss in UK history. When these
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figures were released in January, 2009, RBS shares fell 66% in a single trading day to
10.9p per share. This in itself was a 97% drop from RBS’ peak 2008 share price of 354p
per share.

246

At the same time official data showed the UK to be in recession for the first

time since the early 1990’s.

247

These losses help convey a sense of the rapidity and

severity of the banking crisis UK, and it had become clear that RBS could not remain
viable without government intervention.

4.4

Policy Response: Financial

Interventions
The Northern Rock Crisis prompted legislative changes to allow faster intervention and
resolution of bank failures, before formal bankruptcy proceedings were initiated.

248

Northern Rock had already been nationalised in February, and in September HBOS was
in a similar state of emergency. Lloyds TSB was identified as a preferred takeover
partner. Unlike its British contemporaries, Lloyds had focused on its core businesses with
a low-risk business model. Lloyds TSB had limited exposure to US subprime ABS
markets, a much lower ratio of liabilities to deposits, and in general had “avoided
building an investment bank.”

249

On September 27, 2008 it was announced that Lloyds

would conduct an all-share takeover of HBOS. The UK government agreed to waive
competition concerns in light of the extreme circumstances.

250

The government also

made a secret loan of £25 billion to HBOS at this time which was not revealed until the
following year.

251

The banking UK banking crisis prompted the government to undertake actions in early
October, 2008 similar to those in the US. £50 billion was allocated to recapitalize failing
banks through government purchase of non-voting preference shares. In addition, £200 in
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T-bills was made available to be exchanged for illiquid but high-quality securitized
assets.

252

On October 13, 2008 the government announced £37 billion worth of capital

injections to bailout Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB and HBOS. The government’s
holdings of bank shares came to 60% of RBS and over 40% of Lloyds’ post-merger
equity.

253

The government’s share of Lloyds’ equity would later reach 57%.

254

It should

also be noted that both Lloyds and HBOS shares fell sharply upon news of their merger,
as one of the UK’s strongest and most conservative banks was pressured by the
government to acquire one of the riskiest and most highly-leveraged.

255

Government

guarantees to banks dwarfed the figures relating to direct acquisitions, totalling £400
billion in loss insurance on banks’ loans and toxic assets.

256

These guarantees

underpinned the Government Asset Protection Scheme, the corollary of the TARP
program in the US.

257

Government intervention to prop up systemically important banks (or force their merger)
reiterated the longer-term issue of moral hazard as such actions imply a commitment by
public authorities to rescue banks from insolvency. This issue is still a concern, as the
Banking Act of 2009 “does not clarify whether or in what circumstances the Bank of
England should act as ‘lender of last resort’.”

258

The 2009 Banking Act did however

enhance the crisis management powers of financial regulators by standardizing the
resolution process of insolvent banks and clearly outlines government authority in
facilitating mergers, acquisitions, or nationalisations of failing institutions.

259

Government financial interventions in the UK were more proactive than in the US or
Iceland, representing a greater willingness to support systemically important institutions.
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However the higher proportion of British GDP represented by financial services also
made this an easier choice for the government.

4.5

Policy Response: Monetary Policy

The potential for a systemic credit market failure of the type following Lehman’s demise
in September, 2008 had been considered by UK policymakers since the first signs of
crisis in 2007. The European Central Bank had begun a policy of liquidity injections into
the financial system in August 2007 in response to the trouble at France’s BNP Paribas,
foreshadowing the later responses by the British and American governments. In the UK,
this shift toward direct financial intervention occurred subsequent to the nationalisation
of Northern Rock in October, 2007.

260

To avoid a repeat of the Great Depression,

policymakers in the UK undertook to a) issue public guarantees on deposits and assets to
save banks from collapse, and b) increase the money supply to offset the deflationary
pressures of a credit market freeze.

261

In early 2009 the Bank of England lowered the prime lending rate to the current 0.5% to
ease the constraints on credit availability. It also undertook a Quantitative Easing
program of asset purchases worth £200 billion, which has since been raised to £325
262

billion.

These additional asset purchases provide liquidity to financial firms and

private investors, injecting electronically created money into the economy to stimulate
investment. Quantitative Easing is typically undertaken as additional stimulus once the
prime interest rate approaches zero and cannot be further reduced. These actions were
unprecedented for the Bank of England: the lending rate had never previously been set
below 2%.

263

This monetary expansion generated the greatest depreciation of the pound

sterling since the UK first abandoned the gold standard in 1931.
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the pound is also argued to have allowed the UK to benefit from the global economic
recovery to a greater extent than other economies.

265

As elsewhere, fear of deflationary pressure on currency resulting from restricted liquidity
was a primary concern driving the monetary response.

266

Deflation has still occurred

however, with prices in the UK continuing to hover around 82% of 2005 levels and
exchange rates to the US dollar similar to those seen in the recession of 2000-2001.

267

The saving grace for the UK has been the stability of the euro against depreciations in the
British pound and American dollar. This has generated a relative depreciation of the
pound in relation to the bulk of UK trading partners: the continental European
economies.

268

With little recovery since the deflationary peak in Q1 2009, the monetary

response may be able to claim some credit in stabilising prices and exchange rates. The
policy response has not been able to achieve a substantial recovery to anything near precrisis levels, however the unsustainable nature of pre-crisis conditions may render these
unfair criteria for defining ‘recovery’.

4.6

Policy Response: Fiscal Policy

Along with monetary expansion, the crisis also necessitated government fiscal support to
resume economic growth. The UK is now struggling alongside other major economies to
reduce the structural deficits resulting from fiscal stimulus. While discretionary budget
changes after the fall of 2008 were relatively small and time-limited, automatic stabilisers
greatly increased both public spending and public sector borrowing.

269

The Labour

government’s fiscal policy dating from 1997 was at this point “temporarily suspended”
until 2015-16. The UK budget deficit represented 2.6% of GDP in 2007, 4.7% in 2008,
and 10.9% in 2009 as nondiscretionary spending increased against a shrinking GDP.
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The Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010 subsequently mandated that public deficits must
shrink as a proportion of GDP every fiscal year from 2011 to 2016, and must be halved
from 2010-2014. A general election in May, 2010, saw Labour replaced by a
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government, which announced plans to
accelerate deficit reduction through reduced spending, or ‘austerity.’

271

The UK government’s austerity program is predicated on economic projections wherein
reductions in public spending, and thus demand, are offset by rises in private
expenditure.

272

The argument for reducing deficits has been largely based on the fear of

higher borrowing costs stemming from reduced national credit ratings. The UK Coalition
government, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has used Greece as an example
of this danger scenario.

273

However, Greece’s inability to pay its debts stems largely

from its lack of a national currency (discussed in the section on Greece in this paper),
while the UK can “print money” through the Bank of England to service its national
debt.

274

At least in the short term, this ability to pay the interest on its sovereign debt

allows the UK to avoid the wrath of international credit rating agencies. While long term
inflation is a danger in this scenario, the necessity of avoiding deflation, maintaining
credit availability, and ultimately stimulating investment, would seem to support such
actions in the short term. In comparison with the recovery of growth in the US, the recent
return to recession in the UK implies the wisdom of a Keynesian stimulus approach.

4.7

Analysis

One difference in circumstances between the US and UK was their mortgage market
structure. The majority of UK mortgages are variable rate loans, which are much more
easily influenced by the Bank of England’s prime interest rate than typically fixed-rate
American mortgages. By substantially reducing the base lending rate between fall 2008
and spring 2009, the Bank of England was thus able to indirectly reduce mortgage costs,
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mitigating foreclosures and easing downward pressure on property prices.

275

This was

important because of the harsher repercussions for mortgage default in the UK, because
of which many homeowners would be more desperate to avoid foreclosure. In addition,
more limited capacity to keep up with demand for increased housing in the UK during the
boom translated into less excess supply when the market collapsed. Thus property prices
would not fall as drastically in the UK as in the US.

276

However, as the banks’ balance

sheets (excluding Lloyd’s) were invested heavily in American MBS’s, the UK financial
sector was exposed to house price fluctuations to a greater degree than would be the case
if they were more heavily focused in UK mortgage markets.
A rough consensus has emerged regarding the various factors which led to the financial
crisis, with the rapid growth of credit in the absence of adequate capital seen as the
primary factor.

277

Flawed risk management, pricing errors (especially based on dubious

credit ratings), weak corporate governance and imbalanced compensation schemes, and
opaque systemic and counterparty transparency all contributed to this trend, while
reinforcing and overlapping with each other.

278

On balance, the more proactive stance of

the UK government regarding financial interventions and monetary expansion has helped
stabilize the financial sector. However, fiscal austerity has exacerbated the still-skittish
investment climate and resulted in recession for the overall economy. As fiscal response
is the primary difference between the US and UK cases, the return to growth in the
former and recession in the latter implies an important role for fiscal stimulus despite the
laudable aims of reducing public deficits. This is especially true considering the apparent
ambivalence of credit rating agencies to increasing government debts, at least in countries
with monetary policy autonomy. The Greek case demonstrates that, when monetary
expansion is not an option, the effects of public debt and on national credit ratings and
economic recovery are drastically different.
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5

GREECE

The Greek economy has been hit particularly hard by the global economic crisis – it is
now in its fifth consecutive year of recession. High public spending combined with
economic recession and skyrocketing borrowing rates have drastically increased Greek
sovereign debt, which already represented over 100% of GDP prior to the crisis. Greek
membership in the Euro currency zone has complicated the country’s situation by
limiting the options for both monetary and fiscal response. Monetary policy is severely
constricted as the government cannot print money to stimulate the economy and inflate
its currency, which would reduce the burden of Greek-denominated debts and encourage
exports. The need to pay its debts has forced Greece to take loans from the EU and IMF,
which are conditioned upon drastic reductions in public spending. Greek fiscal policy is
also thus severely constricted at precisely the time when Keynesian theory would argue
for fiscal stimulus.
The uncertainty surrounding Greek austerity politics, bailouts, and a possible exit from
the Euro have kept markets fearful. This has driven up the cost of borrowing for Greece
and driven away investment. The Greek economic crisis is thus a sovereign debt crisis
resulting from government overspending and the policy restrictions of a shared currency,
rather than a result of mismanagement in the financial industry. Similar themes are
discernible however. Greek deficits and debt were misrepresented in the country’s bid to
enter and remain in the Euro-zone, obfuscating debt levels in breach of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) outlined in the Maastricht treaty.

279

This can be seen as an, albeit

indirect, misrepresentation of risk in that Greece took on liabilities it had little hope of
financing in the absence of monetary policy discretion. Crisis resulting from the
reassessment of underestimated (and misrepresented) risk is thus a broader theme which
ties the Greek case to the others in this paper. Shortcomings in fiscal oversight at the
European level – failure to effectively monitor member country finances and debt - here
correlate to macro-prudential failures at the national regulatory level in other cases. The
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severity of recession in the absence of either monetary or fiscal stimulus reinforces the
Keynesian position that these are effective tools in moderating economic contractions.

5.1

Governance of State Finances

Greece’s public administration is characterized by an executive branch with strong
constitutional powers but relatively weak capacity to implement policies. This stems from
a lack of centralized resources and relative operational independence at the ministry
level. Poor intra-governmental coordination is exacerbated by heavily bureaucratic
ministry apparatus which are significantly influenced by unions.

280

Convoluted

budgetary accounting practices not only make isolating and altering budgetary priorities
281

difficult, they also create “much scope for clientelistic and corrupt practices.”

Under

such conditions tax evasion has also become a major issue in Greece. Almost a third of
tax revenues, representing 3.4% of GDP, went uncollected in 2006.

282

Clientelism also

characterizes labour relations in Greece. The main unions represent primarily a core of
public sector workers, with low unionization in the private sector. Employers and
workers of Greece’s few large firms are over-represented, while the many “small and
micro-enterprises” enjoy neither effective representation nor regulation.

283

State institutions in Greece suffer from “chronic mismanagement and endemic
corruption.”

284

The extensive government bureaucracy makes Greece an unappealing

investment market and a difficult place to do business – a World Bank survey ranked
Greece the lowest of any OECD country in terms of ease of doing business.

285

Structural

unemployment before the crisis was already high, especially among the young. This has

280

Kevin Featherstone, “The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed
Regime,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49 no. 2 (2011): 195.
281
Featherstone, “The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU,” 196.
282
Featherstone, “The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU,” 196.
283
Featherstone, “The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU,” 197.
284
George A. Papandreou, “A New Global Financial Architecture: Lessons from the Greek Crisis,”
Mediterranean Quarterly 21 no. 4 (2010): 1.
285
Abboushi, “Analysis and Outlook of the Greek Financial Crisis,” 3.

63

resulted in a large informal economy, representing almost 30% of GDP.

286

Government

provision of services is also strongly defended yet ineffective: the Greek government
provides health care and free education, yet Greece also sees more private spending on
health and education than any other EU country.

287

Greek political economy has typically

favoured “anti-competitive regulation, barriers to entry, relatively cheap labour and stable
product demand.”

288

Greece’s culture of clientelist statism and jealous protection of the

public sector has created an economic environment extremely resistant to reform. This
has contributed to extreme political unrest in response to Government austerity measures.

5.2

Sovereign Debt Bubble

Greek sovereign debt can be seen as an asset bubble because investors extended the
Greek government easy credit at rates below what government finances should have
incurred, indicating an overestimation of the value of holding Greek debt.

289

Greece’s

lack of economic competitiveness and barriers to reform rendered it extremely vulnerable
to the global economic crisis. Greece became the twelfth member of the Euro-zone in
January 2001. A shared currency was expected to stabilize prices, control inflation
variability and allow longer-term economic planning and projections. This in turn would
lower borrowing costs for Greece, which had a history of high and variable inflation.

290

Accession did significantly lower borrowing rates, represented by bond yields, and
inflation, which averaged 3.3% from 2001-2007 as compared to 9.39% from 19912000.

291

GDP growth also increased after accession, averaging around 4% from 2001-

2008, compared to 2.36% from 1991-2000.
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Despite these short-term benefits, structural problems continued to affect the Greek
Economy. Government deficits consistently exceeded the 3% of GDP figure outlined in
the SGP, while total government debt was maintained at roughly 125% of GDP since the
early 2000’s and surpassed 140% of GDP in 2009.

293

This was largely related to rigid

public sector wages. Politicians are not only under extreme pressure from unions to
maintain wage levels, but also use public sector jobs to generate support during elections.
When seeking to reduce government debt (or simply mitigate its increase), Greece has
generally opted to sell public assets or increase taxes rather than decrease spending.

294

Greek public expenditure as a proportion of GDP rose from roughly 45% in 2001 to over
50% by 2009, while deficits rose from 4.63% to 15.55% of GDP over the same period.

295

Greek accession to the Euro also precipitated a decline in competitiveness. While
inflation rates were historically low for Greece, they averaged 1% higher than the Eurozone average from 2001-2009. Wages also increased faster than the Euro-zone average.
Relatively high costs for goods and labour reduced Greek competitiveness, reflected by
the current account deficit which increased from over 7% of GDP in 2001 to almost 15%
296

in 2007-2008.

Because of its membership in the Euro-zone, Greece could not employ

monetary policy to offset this decline in competitiveness by devaluing its currency.

297

Growing budget deficits likewise restricted the scope of potential fiscal policy responses
in the event of economic slowdown, while rigid labour markets reduced the real
economy’s flexibility to deal with a decline in growth. Finally, the enormous proportion
of GDP dependent on non-discretionary government spending meant that reductions in
tax revenue in the event of recession would put severe pressure on already-strained public
finances.
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5.3

Financial Crisis

Greece initially saw few direct effects of the financial crisis which began in August 2007,
which saw yields on Greek bonds increase only mildly. International concerns about
Greek public finances were sparked in October 2009 when the newly-elected socialist
government revealed that Greek deficits were much higher than originally thought.
Previously reported at 3.6% of GDP for 2009, the figure was updated to 12.8% of GDP.
This figure would further rise to 13.6% by April, 2010.

298

Other estimates place the 2009

deficit at 15.55% of GDP, while total government debt represented 142% of GDP.

299

An

EU Commission report in January 2010 revealed “incorrect data, non-transparency,
improperly documented bookkeeping,” and a general abdication of responsibility by the
National Statistical Service.

300

It became clear that the statistics agency had

misrepresented Greek fiscal conditions, reporting false deficits which appeared to
conform to EU convergence criteria. As debt crises struck other small economies, such as
Dubai in November 2009, international financial markets grew much more risk-averse.
Greek fiscal and trade imbalances became a focus of intense speculation.

301

By December 2009 international financial markets were concerned over a potential Greek
default. The three major credit rating agencies repeatedly downgraded Greek bonds,
which were judged by Standard & Poor to have reached ‘junk’ status by April, 2010.
Bond yield spreads rose sharply, reaching 15.3% on two-year bonds.

302

By May, 2010

interest on 10-year bonds had reached 38% and default seemed “imminent.”

303

Questions

were raised as to whether Greece would be driven into sovereign default if it could not
pay its debts. The deficit revelation was a serious concern for international financial
markets in assessing Greece’s borrowing capacity, as well as for the Euro-zone which
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depends on data reported by member states in forming policy.

304

Tellingly, the Greek

bailout of 2010 stipulated that the statistics bureau must be made independent of the
government.

5.4

Contagion through market uncertainty

To a far greater degree than that seen in this paper’s other case studies, the Greek
experience was strongly influenced by exogenous policy responses to the crisis. This
stems from the fact that Greece is part of the European Union and, more specifically, the
Euro-zone. As institutions whose memberships consist of sovereign states, the EU and
Euro-zone labour under a state of “policy conditionality” rather than “policy
coherence.”

305

Governance institutions in the Euro-zone have limited capacity to react to

a crisis of the present magnitude, “lacking the capacity for speedy reaction, policy
discretion and centralized action.”

306

The Maastricht treaty forbade excessive deficits but

included no legal instruments to intervene and impose austerity on errant states. Such
enforced austerity has been a condition of bailouts to European states, especially Greece,
although such bailouts were theoretically prohibited by Maastricht. This institutional
unpreparedness created extreme uncertainty in the face of the Greek crisis, which was
exacerbated by the slow response of the ECB and Euro-zone member states.
Euro-zone governments agreed to the principle of a joint IMF-EU bailout for Greece in
late March, 2010. By the end of April Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou
requested the plan be enacted, and on May 2 Greece was extended the first installment of
a €110 billion rescue loan.
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The Greek bailout was not simply intended to stabilize

Greek finances – German and French banks held Greek debt which was backed by
guarantees from those countries’ governments.

304

308

Germany, France, Italy, and other

Featherstone, “The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU,” 199.
Papandreou, “A New Global Financial Architecture,” 3.
306
Featherstone, “The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU,” 201.
307
Featherstone, “The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU,” 202.
308
Fischer et al., “Why the Greek Meltdown Became a Euro-Zone Crisis,” 46.
305

67

Euro-zone governments held stakes in a combined €80 billion of Greek debt.

309

A Greek

default would also require restructuring the Euro, which would in turn devalue Eurozone
bonds as well.

310

These transmission paths of contagion from Greece to European

national bond markets and the Euro itself generated fears of the havoc a Greek default
could wreak on the rest of Europe, despite the small proportion of European GDP
represented by the Greek economy.

311

Without the rescue loan Greece would certainly collapse, possibly taking the Euro down
with it. But even the May, 2010 ‘rescue’ was at best a temporary solution. Standard &
Poor estimated Greek debt to reach 144% of GDP by 2015, although it actually reached
this figure by 2010. Greek debt in 2010 is estimated to be 165.4% of GDP, a figure not
previously projected until 2016 at the earliest.

312

Greece is now borrowing just to pay

interest on its debt.

5.5

Monetary Expansion, Fiscal

contraction
While individual Euro-zone countries lacked the institutional independence to engage in
monetary policy responses, there was action at inter- and supra-national levels. In the
week following the Greek bailout loan announced on May 2, Euro-zone governments
agreed to a €750 billion bailout guarantee to restore confidence in the currency’s weaker
members. This was supplemented by a €321 billion commitment from the IMF and a deal
with the US Federal Reserve to increase dollar availability through liquidity swaps.

313

The ECB used this liquidity to begin buying public and private debt, reversing its earlier
conservative stance and lowering collateral standards to allow it to absorb higher-risk
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assets such as Greek bonds. While this temporarily increased liquidity, the hesitance at
buying Euro-zone government bonds remained.

314

Despite the avoidance of a short-term

liquidity crunch, the issue of central government debt and likely inability to pay remains
a dominant factor in financial markets’ aversion to Greek bonds. The EU-IMF ‘rescue’
packages are in fact loans, which have increased short-term liquidity into the system but
have added to the debt overhang at the heart of Greek solvency problems.

5.6

Austerity and Politics

The austerity measures imposed on Greece as a condition of its bailouts are intended to
reign in public spending and reduce deficits in the hopes of increasing market confidence
in Greek fiscal solvency. The Stability and Growth Programme proposed by Greece to
the EU in May 2010 called for budget cuts equivalent to 8.6% of GDP. Pensions, salaries,
and jobs in the public sector were to be cut, while protected industries would be
liberalized. The union response to this was strong, with truckers and maritime workers
shutting down the countries transport infrastructure. By July 2010 public sector unions
had called six general strikes.

315

Rioting has also been widespread, especially in the run-

up to the February, 2012 elections.
An additional €130 billion EU-IMF loan was approved in March 2012, and Greece’s
private creditors have agreed to significant value write-downs and refinancing. Greek
avoidance of a sovereign default is dependent upon access to these funds, which in turn
are conditional upon robust fiscal austerity measures. As in the UK, growth projections
under austerity are predicated on the replacement of public expenditure with private
investment to stimulate demand. However the pro-austerity government elected in
February has already fallen. Subsequent elections in early May proved inconclusive.

316

The uncertainty generated by the political contest over austerity measures has kept
markets sceptical regarding the likelihood of sustained austerity, and by extension the
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likelihood that Greece will avoid default.

317

Greek borrowing costs have thus remained

high, while investment has continued to be scarce. The lack of private investment has
exacerbated the economic effects of austerity, resulting in socio-economic dislocation
which adds to the political pressure against austerity.
The result of this vicious cycle has yet to be seen, however none of the potential
outcomes are particularly positive. Either anti-austerity political and social forces will
gain power, in which case they will attempt to renegotiate the terms of the EU-IMF
bailout. Should they succeed, confidence in Euro-zone governance will likely be further
damaged. Should they fail, Greece will likely default on its sovereign debt and potentially
have to leave the Euro. In this case, a precedent will have been set for member country
debt defaults, increasing the perceived risk relating to bond markets in other highlyindebted Euro-zone countries. In this sense, the Euro-zone faced its own “Lehman
moment” in 2010.

318

Greek collapse would be perceived to herald the possibility of

similar outcomes elsewhere, and shake confidence in Euro-zone bond markets the same
way Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy shattered investor confidence in highly leveraged
financial firms. This could precipitate a further expansion of the Euro-zone sovereign
debt crisis as capital flees the bond markets of highly-indebted countries such as Ireland,
Portugal, Italy, and Spain. Contagion thus stems from counterparty risk reappraisal by
creditors, whether the borrower is a financial firm or a national government.
The less likely scenario of a new pro-austerity government in Greece is systemically
preferable – the execution of the EU-IMF bailout proposal would likely allow Greece to
stay in the Euro. This course of action could avert a system-wide expansion of the crisis.
However, that may provide little solace to Greeks forced to muddle through a long and
painful recovery under the twin burdens of fiscal austerity and the competitive challenge
of an overvalued currency.
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5.7

Analysis

The revision of fiscal data since October, 2009 created a strong reaction in financial
markets and drove up yields on Greek bonds. This represents a market correction against
the previous overvaluation of Greek debt based on erroneous data. Gibson et al. have
found that in the period from 2001 to mid-2009, spreads on bond yields between Greek
and German bonds were significantly lower than should have been expected according to
economic fundamentals. That is, Greek bonds were overvalued and their yields were
artificially low. Following the revision of fiscal data starting in mid-2009, financial
markets seem to have overcorrected in the opposite direction. By September 2010, the
same researchers found spreads on Greek bond yields to be almost 50% higher than could
be justified by economic fundamentals.

319

Informational non-transparency played a significant role in the Greek crisis in the form of
misrepresentations by the national statistics agency. The European Commission has since
proposed to undertake greater oversight of Euro-zone countries’ budgets, including
assessing national statistics agencies.

320

This type of governance relates to national debt

levels rather than private firms’ risk evaluations. However sovereign debt, economic
growth, and trade imbalances largely reflect a country’s risk of default. Greek
membership in the Euro-zone was predicated on levels of debt and deficits incongruent
with economic growth and competitiveness, due to the large role of inflexible public
spending in the Greek economy. Greece concealed its spending and debt levels in order
to stay in the Euro, membership in which denied it the monetary policy flexibility
required to respond to its debt crisis.
Low interest rates and the perception of stability resulting from accession to the Euro
lowered Greek borrowing costs from 2001-2009. Like American, British, and Icelandic
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banks, the Greek government could have used this period of growth to reduce its debt and
consolidate its finances along countercyclical, Keynesian lines. Instead, all four
squandered this opportunity by borrowing further. Private financial firms increased
leveraging by acquiring assets – the Greek government ran deficits to increase public
sector expenditures. The key link is that both were able to maintain low borrowing costs
by misrepresenting the scope and scale of their liabilities. Revelations of financial
mismanagement spurred dramatic risk reappraisals, causing an international run on Greek
bonds, not unlike the capital flight from over-leveraged financial institutions elsewhere.
Thus, the issues of informational transparency and institutional accountability are at the
heart of governance reforms necessary to prevent future crises whether the subject is
private corporations or national governments.
A final word is necessary on the exogenous role of foreign financial firms in the Greek
crisis. The highly influential role of American credit rating agencies in the evaluation of
assessment and reassessment of sovereign risk is striking. The emerging power these
private firms can exert over sovereign states is a newly recognized and often criticized
dynamic.

321

Moreover, the drastic over- and subsequent under-valuing of Greek debt was

not solely due to fiscal misrepresentation by the state. French and German financial firms
had also “flooded” Greece with cheap credit upon its accession to the Eurozone. It has
been suggested that these firms, holding over $100 billion in Greek debt, sought to
exacerbate the crisis to force a bailout and prevent Greece from defaulting.

322

The short

selling of Greek sovereign debt through Credit Default Swaps (CDS), essentially betting
that Greece would default, further drove market concerns and contributed to the sense of
panic which prompted the bailout.

323

European financial firms thus also engaged in what

might be described as predatory lending, in this case to the Greek state rather than
individual households.
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The role of ratings agencies as de facto macro-prudential oversight bodies entails extreme
moral hazard. This represents an insufficient system of ad hoc international financial
governance since these institutions and their corporate partners have major stakes in the
success or failure (through short selling) of the firms and markets whose risk they assess.
The role of investment firms in driving the crisis is potentially even more serious. It has
been charged that once French and German firms holding Greek debt began to face losses
on this investment they endeavoured to drive the crisis to the point where a bailout was
necessary, thus transferring their losses to European taxpayers.

324

Indeed, a national

government can be seen as the ultimate form of an institution which is ‘too-big-to-fail.’
Regardless of crisis manipulation by private firms, Greek policy going into the crisis
bears criticism. High public and private debt was the trigger of the sovereign debt crisis.
Yet these factors would have nevertheless restricted the scope of fiscal policy in the case
of an economic crisis transmitted through trade channels. Growing trade deficits certainly
worsened the crisis, however it was the increasing difficulty of the government to borrow
which undermined public spending, the lynchpin of the Greek economy. Keynesian and
neoliberal theories would differ on the propriety of deficit spending during recession, but
neither would favour the deficit spending during times of growth exhibited by Greece
(and the US, UK, and Iceland) in the period from 2001 to 2007. Greek deficits in this
period averaged over 5.8% of GDP, compared to about 1.7% for the Eurozone as a
325

whole.

Greek political culture was incapable of lowering the public share of GDP, while this fact
was hidden in the interests of Eurozone membership. Such membership was in turn what
allowed the access to easy credit from European financial markets which drove the Greek
debt bubble. It was thus this initial lack of informational transparency, exacerbated by
institutional profligacy (in this case, by the state), which can be seen as the primary cause
of the Greek meltdown. Without this misrepresentation of debt, Greece would not have
been allowed into the eurozone, and would thus have not been subject to the monetary
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and fiscal constraints which have thrown Greece into depression – and the European
currency zone into crisis. Monetary and fiscal policy responses have thus not been
available to Greece, resulting in it facing the worst recession of any case in this paper.
This reiterates the usefulness of Keynesian stimulus tools in softening the impact of
recession. Interestingly, the bailout of institutions (countries) which are ‘too big to fail’
has occurred at the European level, and has been essentially in preventing a Greek default
which would likely unravel the European currency as it currently exists. The overarching
importance of regulatory oversight and coordination to ensure risk transparency to avoid
sharp, painful market corrections through the reevaluation of risk is once again made
clear in the Greek case.

6

CANADA

That Canada experienced the global recession is clear – Canadian GDP shrank by 2.77%
in 2009, after growing only 0.69% in 2008.

326

Data from the Bank of Canada shows

steep initial drops in both exports and investment at the onset of the global recession,
mirroring conditions in the United States.

327

Despite this initially steep economic dip,

Canada’s economy recovered faster than in any previous recession despite a lag in export
and investment recovery. Household balance sheets declined by 8.7% from 2007-2009,
compared to 26.6% in the US.

328

In fact, domestic demand was supported instead

through increased household and government spending.
Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies were employed to weather the collapse of
global demand and credit, and this was possible because “Business and household
balance sheets were relatively sound, and the banking system was robust, managed
prudently, and sufficiently capitalized.”
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response has lessened however, as interest rates approach the zero lower-bound, while
public and household debt are now much higher due to the recession and government
response. Moreover, structural vulnerabilities such as growing household debt, a
domestic housing bubble, and exposure to the continued global downturn - especially
through the European debt crisis and demand spillovers from the United States - present
continuing challenges moving forward.

330

Despite these greater long-term challenges, the initial Canadian preparation for and
response to the recent recession has been relatively successful in mitigating the worst
effects of economic shock. Canada did not experience a collapse in the housing market,
or anywhere near the scale of job losses, as seen in the United States.

331

Stimulating

demand through household and public deficit spending during a recession reflects a
distinctly Keynesian approach, as does the increase in private and government savings
(deficit reduction) during the pre-recession commodity boom.

332

Moreover, the strong

financial sector regulation historically seen in Canada favours a statist, interventionist
perspective over the dominant neoliberal, deregulatory paradigm of the last two decades.
Canada’s strong financial regulation and prior fiscal restraint resemble the policies
favoured by international financial institutions such as the European Central Bank and the
IMF.
Canada’s superior performance through the financial crisis and recession thus
demonstrates the combination of effective monetary and fiscal policy responses, as well
as timely and deliberate financial interventions. Crucially, the Canadian case also
demonstrates the effect of sound financial regulatory governance in mitigating the onset
of financial crisis in the first place. A much higher proportion of Canadian financial
assets fell under the regulated banking sector versus the unregulated “shadow” banking in
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over-the-counter securities which gained such large market shares in the US, UK, and
Iceland. This drastically reduced the effects of the collapse in American real estate values
in Canada, while prudent corporate and regulatory governance helped maintain stability
in Canadian housing prices. Canada’s more muted experience of the financial and
economic crisis thus correlates to successful implementation of all four policy variables
examines in this paper, with the key variable of sound financial regulation also limiting
exposure to the US-generated crisis.

6.1
6.1.1

Financial Regulation
Financial Regulation - Banking

Canada’s banking system is based on branch banking by the “big 6” national banks.
These institutions engage in commercial, retail, and investment banking as well as
providing wealth management and mutual funds.

333

The small number of large banks in

Canada helps facilitate government intervention and coordination with the banking sector
as a whole. The government maintains an “implicit guarantee” of banks, while also
claiming the right to intervene to force mergers between strong and failing banks.

334

It

has been suggested that this governmental under-writing of the financial sector can allow
technically insolvent banks to stay afloat in times of crisis, maintaining stock prices far
higher than the market value of their assets alone would justify.

335

Gradual deregulation from the 1960’s through the 1980’s consolidated universal banking
in Canada, allowing single banks to operate commercial and investment banking, as well
as insurance and securities brokerage services.

336

Thus, Canadian banks were already

‘universal’ long before the American repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which
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allowed commercial-investment banks, securities dealers, and insurance brokerages to
formally merge.

337

The primary difference between the institutional structures of

Canadian and American financial regulation is thus not the type of activities financial
firms are allowed to undertake, but the centrality of regulatory authority which oversees
them. Regional and National banks only emerged in the US in the 1980’s, by which time
Canadian banks were already operating within an oligopolistic cartel structure.
In fact before the 1980’s Canadian banks were typically more highly leveraged than
American banks. However Canadian firms were able to fund assets through their large
and stable deposit base rather than more skittish money markets as seen in the United
States.

338

Canadian banks thus lent more as a proportion of assets than American banks

until the 1980’s. The low risk of failure, thanks to the implicit government guarantee,
combined with higher returns on equity through increased leverage, allowed Canadian
banks to be bolder than their American counterparts during this period.

339

However this

occurred under the aegis of centralized federal regulation and oversight, with the clear
acknowledgement of government supervision and authority to intervene in the event of
crisis. This combination of higher profits and greater stability mitigated competition in
the Canadian financial industry – firms became more interested in long-term growth and
maintenance than short-term survival. This in turn is argued to have “led to conservative
banking and regulatory cultures.”

340

Conservative banking as a result of reduced risk may seem counter-intuitive, however
this outcome occurred in Canada because banks traded stability for more rigid
governmental supervision. American financial regulation is fragmented into numerous
state and federal regulators, which are further divided according to the type of operation
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in question (securities, insurance, etc.). Even the Federal Reserve is broken into twelve
privately-owned regional banks.

341

This worked well enough before the 1980’s, when the

US banking sector was divided into thousands of smaller banks with no extensive
national branch banking networks.

342

However the deregulation of the 1980’s-90’s,

culminating in the repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999, created a newly nationwide banking
sector with nothing like comprehensive regulatory oversight.
Since the 1980’s rules governing capital adequacy for financial institutions have been
outlined in the internationally-recognized Basel Accord. Current standards are outlined
under “Basel II”, although the amendments proposed in 2010 (“Basel III”) would raise
capital requirements.

343

Canada, the United States and the European Union all subscribe

to Basel II, but Canadian domestic capital requirements are in fact more strict than those
formally required under the treaty. Neither Canada nor the US allows an official riskweighted capital-to-assets greater than 20:1. Crucially though, American regulations do
not include off-balance sheet activities in this calculation.

344

Canada’s regulatory

framework thus directly mitigated the increase of leverage, through off-balance sheet
activity, which so destabilized American and European commercial banks in the recent
crisis.

6.1.2

Financial Regulation – Securities

Equity, bond, and derivatives trading by financial firms requires transparency, through
standardized accounting and external auditing, in order to prevent unfair market
manipulation by those with inside knowledge. Until the 1990’s, the regulation of
financial products in Canada increasingly converged with that of the United States.
During this period, Canada’s Accounting Standards Board (ASB) brought regulations
into line the United States’ Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). This was
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motivated both by bilateral trade purposes as well as the increasingly accepted nature of
GAAP globally.

345

This trend of American financial accounting dominance was

interrupted in 2002 when the European Union adopted the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) used by the International Accounting Standards Board based
in London, UK.

346

In 2005 the ASB announced a shift in focus from GAAP to IFRS conformity, since the
American Securities and Exchange Commission allows foreign companies to report
under these rules. In fact, even American companies will be allowed to report to the SEC
using IFRS by 2014.

347

North American and European regulatory governance is thus

converging in the realm of accounting standards, which are a vital basis for external
auditing and ultimately micro- and macro-prudential oversight. This forms the
informational basis for effective international coordination and oversight in these areas.
However, the institutional authority and cooperation required for prudential oversight at
the international level has not yet manifested itself to the degree seen in accounting
standards.
While international accounting standards can help improve transparency by mitigating
arbitrage, it should be noted that mere standardization is not a panacea. Practices such as
“mark-to-market” accounting, which value securities according to their current market
value rather than the solvency of underlying assets, are still allowed under both GAAP
and IFRS.

348

‘Transparency’ in securities’ regulation can thus have different meanings –

transparency according to current market values gives investors clear information on the
likely short-term performance of assets. This contributes to procyclicality as assets are
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overvalued during bubble growth, and then collapse in value during contraction – “even
in cases where the underlying assets were secure and at a zero risk of default.”

349

Accounting standards are a vital aspect of transparency in securities regulation and thus
of macro-prudential oversight, however institutional authority is required to execute
effective governance using available information at the national as well as international
level.
Canada does not have a national securities regulator, relying instead on securities
regulation at the provincial level. The influence over financial stability of “near banks” –
hedge funds, private capital funds, and trusts – in Canada is less than in the United States,
due to the overwhelming concentration of financial assets in Canada’s six largest banks.
However these “near banks” can still amplify instability in the case of a liquidity crisis as
they require continuous short-term financing, while they do not have the deep pools of
capital and liquidity maintained by federally regulated banks. During the financial crisis,
many of these non-banks could not afford to repurchase assets which had been
securitized but could no longer be refinanced. This resulted in “a $32 billion problem that
left investors with substantial losses.”
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It has thus been argued that these institutions

require a federal regulatory framework similar to that which governs formal banks. Such
a framework would include capital and liquidity requirements as well as inspection,
micro-prudential oversight, and a liquidity provider of last resort.

6.1.3

Financial Regulation – Macro-prudential

oversight
Since the 1980’s the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) has
been Canada’s main overseer of micro-prudential regulation. Micro-prudential oversight
refers to the regulation of individual financial firms to maintain best practices and protect
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depositors, as opposed to macro-prudential governance which seeks to balance systemic
risk in the financial system as a whole.

351

OSFI confers with the Bank of Canada, Canada

Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC), the Department of Finance, and the Financial
Consumer Agency of Canada through the Financial Institution Supervisory Committee.
FISC does not regularly include provincial securities regulators or the Canadian
Mortgage and Housing Corporation, rendering it ill-suited to coordinating policy
regarding overall financial stability.

352

FISC does however also convene, occasionally

alongside provincial securities regulators and CMHC, under the Senior Advisory
Committee, which is chaired by the deputy finance minister. Were financial stability to
be formally articulated in SAC’s mandate, as well as those of its members, this could
form the foundation for even more effective macro-prudential oversight at the national
level.
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While Canada fared better in the recent crisis than the United States and United
Kingdom, this also indicates that any excessive systemic financial sector risk might
remain as-yet obscured. The danger of this only increases as ‘hot money’ seeks a safe
haven in Canada’s adulated financial sector, especially the booming Canadian real estate
market. An apt analogy might be the passengers on a sinking ship attempting to rush into
a single lifeboat, with the risk of overturning the lifeboat itself. As such, the role of
macro-prudential oversight is of vital importance not only for recovering economies but
also for countries, like Canada, seeking to avoid a repeat of the crisis.

6.2

Housing and Financial Asset Bubble

It might be presumed that Canada’s broad and deep economic integration with the United
States would make the country more susceptible than others to the bursting of the US
housing bubble. However, significant differences in mortgage market governance have
helped Canada avoid the exposure to mortgage-backed securities seen in the US, UK, and
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Iceland. Unlike in the US, mortgage interest payments in Canada are not taxdeductible.

354

Canadian mortgage-holders are also required to repay the full amount of

their mortgage even in foreclosure, and this “full recourse” is enforceable through asset
seizure or wage garnishing. This factor alone has been argued to reduce the rate of
delinquency even as Canadian house prices decline.

355

Roughly 70% of Canadian mortgages are funded through deposits by large deposit-taking
institutions. Mortgage loans representing more than 80% of the property’s value are
required by law to be insured. Privately insured loans receive a 90% guarantee by the
Canadian government, while loans insured with the Canadian Mortgage and Housing
Corporation (CMHC) have a full government guarantee, and are thus considered ‘risk356

free’ for purposes of securitization.

Securitization of CMHC-guaranteed mortgages

began in 1987 through the National Housing Act Mortgage Backed-Securities program.
CMHC also operates the Canada Housing Trust, which issues Canada Mortgage Bonds
and uses the proceeds to purchase NHA-MBS’s.

357

Canada thus has in place institutions

similar to the American FNMA (Fannie) and FHLMC (Freddie), except that they are
fully owned and explicitly guaranteed by the Canadian government.
Canada’s mortgage market is dominated by the CMHC, a crown corporation wholly
owned by the Canadian government and which is a direct conduit for government
housing policy. The CMHC is operated on a commercial basis with the expectation of
being self-funding through competitive default coverage on an actuarial basis. It is thus a
crown corporation operated as a for-profit business. Like other insurers, the CMHC is
required to pay any shortfall between foreclosure sale proceeds and the full value of an
insured loan. CMHC represents about 70% of the Canadian mortgage insurance market,
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insuring about half of outstanding mortgage debt in Canada.

358

Until recently CMHC

reported to Parliament under the supervision of the Minister of Human resources. Unlike
private mortgage insurers, CMHC was not supervised by the Office of the Superintendent
of Financial Institutions (OSFI), Canada’s financial regulatory authority. It nevertheless
sets a target of twice the OSFI minimum capital requirements, and at last report was
above this target.

359

In April, 2012 the federal government tabled legislation to bring CMHC under OFSI
supervision.

360

This is part of a broader government effort to cool Canada’s booming

housing market, which many argue is in danger of generating a debt-fuelled asset bubble
if it has not already done so.

361

With the ratio of average home price to income in Canada

is well above the historic average and household debt averaging over 150% of disposable
income, OSFI also plans to tighten mortgage underwriting criteria for banks.

362

All of

these details, however, describe a financial system which sees close coordination between
public and private institutions. The guarantee of housing is an explicit liability of the
Canadian government, and mortgage issuance and securitization has thus been much
more strictly regulated in Canada than elsewhere. Moreover, the concentration of
Canadian financial firms and their relatively conservative business practices have resulted
in much less penetration of Canadian financial markets by subprime mortgages and overthe-counter (shadow banking) securities. Canada’s financial sector and regulatory
framework thus favour long-term stability and growth over competition and financial
innovation. It also imposes more comprehensive and active government oversight of
financial institutions in recognition of their systemic importance, in exchange for the
right to operate as an essentially oligopolistic cartel.
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6.3

Financial Crisis

Canada did experience a financial crisis along with other developed countries.
Confidence in Canadian banks’ solvency, as implied by lending rates and Credit Default
Swap prices, did show a marked increase along with their foreign counterparts. However,
Canadian banks did not suffer from the liquidity shortages afflicting American and
European financial institutions through late-2007 and early-2008.

363

No Canadian bank

failed during the financial crisis, nor was there the flood of mortgage defaults as seen in
the United States. Interbank lending rates in Canada did increase alongside those in the
US and Europe, but to a far lesser extent.

364

Canadian banks also did not exhibit the

degree of liquidity hoarding observable in other banks starting with the announcement of
losses at BNP Paribas in early August 2007.

365

While some hoarding occurred in the

period directly following Lehman’s collapse in September 2008, Canadian banks
returned to pre-crisis lending and borrowing patterns after December, 2008.

366

Canadian banks made relatively conservative use of liquidity auctions, especially
compared to European banks, offered by the Central Bank from late-2007 and early2008. Moreover, Canadian banks only made limited use of the “bailout” government
purchase of MBS after January, 2009, when American and European banks were still
scrambling for liquidity.

367

This relatively conservative liquidity-seeking behaviour

indicates “that participants did not believe there were significant liquidity or counterparty
368

risks.”

The crisis of confidence in the general financial sector which served as such a

driver – and amplifier – of the financial crisis elsewhere was thus largely absent in
Canada.

363

Allen, Jason, Ali Hortaçsu, and Jakub Kastl. “Analyzing Default Risk and Liquidity Demand during a
Financial Crisis: the Case of Canada.” Bank of Canada Working Paper Series (2011): 3, accessed June 5,
2012, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/banque-bank-canada/FB3-2-111-17-eng.pdf.
364
Emanuella Enenajor, Alex Sebastian and Jonathan Witmer, “An Assessment of the Bank of Canada’s
term PRA Facility,” North American Journal of Economics and Finance 23 (2012): 123.
365
Allen et al., “Analyzing Default Risk and Liquidity Demand,” 14.
366
Allen et al., “Analyzing Default Risk and Liquidity Demand,” 16.
367
Nadeau, 6.
368
Allen et al., “Analyzing Default Risk and Liquidity Demand,” 1.

84

6.4

Financial Intervention

It is not strictly speaking true that “the Canadian government did not bail out its banks,”
however the execution of these “bailout” loans was both more conservative and more
concerted than the haphazard process seen in the US and Europe. During the global
financial crisis the Canadian government approved the Insured Mortgage Purchase
Program (IMPP), a scheme to loan CMHC the money to finance up to $125 billion in
NHA-MBS from Canadian banks.

369

The Canadian government funded this loan by

issuing debt instruments such as bonds, increasing the total outstanding government debt
on such instruments by about 30%, to about $520 billion. However, the interest on these
instruments constituted the minimum bid yield in actual IMPP auctions.

370

This means

that the program will be revenue-neutral in the long-term and should in fact produce
revenue as many bids were over the minimum yield.

371

Initially set at $25 billion in October, 2008, the program expanded along with the crisis,
reaching $75 billion in November. The 2009 budget finally increased the available credit
372

to $125 billion.

This allowed banks to increase the proportion of liquid assets on their

balance sheets by offloading hard-to-sell MBS. However, unlike the American bank
bailouts under TARP, the assets purchased by CMHC were all already insured either
privately or through CMHC and thus guaranteed by the government. The American
policy response was first to inject capital into insolvent institutions, then to buy those
institutions highest-risk, and therefore least valuable, assets. The Canadian response
provided banks with liquidity in exchange for their lowest-risk assets: mortgages already
guaranteed against default by the government.

373

The Canadian government was thus

able to provide banks with greater liquidity to see them through the crisis without adding
‘toxic assets’ onto its balance sheet.
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The efficacy of IMPP in easing banks’ liquidity constraints in order to facilitate lending
and stimulate the economy is difficult to directly gauge. In Q4 2008, household credit
extended by banks increased by just over $50 billion, twice what the CMHC purchased in
374

that period.

Bank lending in Canada never experienced the panicked contraction it saw

in the US and elsewhere, and the IMPP reinforced this confidence in liquidity access on
the part of financial institutions.

6.5

Monetary Policy Response

The Bank of Canada responded with standard liquidity injections in the second half of
2007. By the end of 2007 Canada joined the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Swiss
Bank, and the European Central Bank in introducing term auction facilities (bidding on
short-term loans) to increase liquidity.

375

These facilities were allowed to expire as

markets calmed after December, 2007 but were reintroduced in March, 2008 in response
to the collapse of Bear Stearns.

376

It bears noting that Canada’s term Purchase and Resale

Agreement (term PRA) facility was slightly different from its American counterpart in
the Fed’s Term Auction Facility (TAF). Term PRA auctions required winning
participants to pay the interest rate at which they bid, whereas TAF participants had only
to pay the lowest accepted rate at auction regardless of their initial bid.

377

This made

Canadian liquidity facilities more conservative and less generous to banks than their
American counterparts.
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, interbank lending rates in
Canada jumped upward as global credit evaporated and the Bank of Canada took on a
more important role as a provider of short-term liquidity.

378

As part of the G7 action

plan, term auctions increased in value and frequency, peaking at 2% of the total value of
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financial industry assets (compared to 7% in the US and 5% in the Eurozone).

379

The

expansion of acceptable collateral for government lending under IMPP also eased
liquidity problems for institutions holding less-valued, but nevertheless low-risk, MBS
assets.

380

However, unlike elsewhere this period of extreme risk-aversion did not last

beyond 2008.

381

Canadian interbank markets had largely calmed by April, 2009, when

the Bank of Canada lowered the prime interest rate to the effective lower bound and
pledged to maintain that level for one year. Throughout 2009 Canadian funding markets
continued to improve, term PRA operations shrank in size, term, and issue frequency
until they were phased out starting in April 2010.

382

Researchers have found “robust evidence” that announcements of term PRA facilities
contributed to lowering liquidity premiums for Canadian banks, encouraging lending by
reinforcing confidence in short-term funding markets.

383

The role of monetary policy in

moderating economic cycles is well founded in Canada. Canada was the second country
to implement a formal inflation target in 1991, and the Bank of Canada has employed
monetary policy since that time to keep the interest rate very near its stated goal of 2%.
Emphasizing the evolution of monetary policy as a response to economic disruptions,
Christopher Ragan argues that this expansion of the Bank of Canada’s role “would not
have happened without the shocks and policy mistakes and learning that occurred over
the previous 30 years.”
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6.6

Fiscal Policy Response

As a compliment to expansive monetary policy, and the IMPP designed to shore up the
financial system, the Canadian government also embarked on an ambitious fiscal
stimulus program. Canada’s Economic Action Plan provided $47.2 billion in areas
including: construction and home building incentives; transportation infrastructure, and;
385

lowering corporate and individual taxes.

Initiatives included personal income tax relief

and infrastructural projects, many of which have been undertaken in partnership with the
provinces. The government earmarked $14 billion in corporate tax incentives and
subsidies, and of this $9.7 billion was used to bail out the automotive industry. Initiatives
by provincial governments added over $14 billion to the total government stimulus
spending in Canada.

386

The government claimed credit for the upswing in economic growth in the second half of
2009, following three consecutive quarters of negative growth. However, a study by the
Fraser Institute published in 2010 attributed less than 10% of the increase in growth to
the stimulus program, instead crediting business investment and net exports.

387

This

report itself came under fire from industry leaders such as the Construction Sector
Council. They disagreed, arguing that the study was flawed in its conclusion that fiscal
stimulus was ineffective because it ignored the 2-3 year time horizons for rolling out
major projects. The study was also criticized for ignoring the less-quantifiable effect
stimulus spending - especially infrastructural spending – has on business confidence in
the private sector.

388

The report also overlooked the effect of stimulus in maintaining

lower unemployment in the recession-prone construction industry, which results in lower
spending on automatic stabilizers such as employment insurance.
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With Canadian growth slowing in response to prolonged weak global demand in the
United States, Europe, and Asia, the impulse may arise for additional fiscal stimulus.
However even those on the left have argued that additional stimulus would add little to
the economic benefits presently derived from easy monetary policy and the ample
liquidity in the financial system. It has been pointed out that stimulating home ownership
would if anything be counterproductive, given the currently expanding housing asset
bubble and over-indebted household balance sheets.

390

Currently high levels of unused

production capacity in light of uncertain future demand mean that investment stimulus
would also result in little additional output. Companies are already sitting on unused plant
and liquid capital which they hesitate to employ, they do not require more from the
government. Finally, tax cuts have been argued to be an inappropriate means of shortterm economic stabilization due to the long time horizons required to realize their
stimulative economic effects.

391

While those on the left and right disagree regarding the effect of government stimulus
along ideological grounds, and neither would advocate its further extension, it is probably
safe to say that the stimulus program had at most a modest effect on Canadian growth.
However, the American experience demonstrates that even massive stimulus spending
will not generate wide scale economic recovery in the absence of more broad-based
credit availability and business confidence. In this regard, the government’s effective
monetary policy response, and especially the perception of stability of Canadian banks
throughout the crisis, can be credited with the return to economic growth much more than
can Fiscal Stimulus.

6.7

Economic Recovery

Gordon Isfeld puts the causes of Canada’s relatively strong performance through the
crisis and recession succinctly, crediting “a timely macro-economic policy response and a
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solid banking sector.”

392

Canadian policies correlate to markedly better economic

performance than other developed countries following the restoration of market
confidence by 2010. All major Canadian industries except utilities posted gains in 2010.
Manufacturing, wholesale trade, and minerals extraction all grew at or just over 5% in
2010 while retail, transportation, and the financial sector also grew as a result of these
primary activities.

393

Spillovers from the drop in global demand kept exports steady at

just under 30% of nominal GDP, from a pre-recession level of 35%.

394

Excluding

housing, business investment continued to lag and was dominated by construction of
energy infrastructure. Construction was the strongest contributor to GDP growth in 2010
at 8.1%, reflecting Canada’s booming real estate market. Indeed, by 2011 the share of
GDP represented by residential construction has scarcely fallen from its 2007 peak.

395

The heavy role of construction in Canada’s economic recovery carries inherent risks
however, as outlined in the section on Canada’s housing bubble above.
Canada benefited from a sound financial system and prompt government policy response
in the financial crisis and recession of 2007-2009. The national savings rate was 13.8%
396

heading into the recession, compared to less than 1% in the US.

Its economic growth

has continued at relatively high levels compared to other developed economies thanks to
capital flight into Canada’s ‘safe’ financial sector, continuing high commodity prices, and
the acceleration of debt-driven consumption by the public and subsequently private
sectors. However, these factors complicate Canada’s position moving forward. The
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government is wisely trying to curb excessive financial speculation, especially in the
overheated housing market.

397

Canada entered a trade deficit in late 2008, as commodity prices increased while demand
for manufactures like automobiles dropped worldwide. The deficit widened in both 2009
and 2010, reflecting a faster recovery in domestic spending than in other developed
economies. As government spending subsided, domestic demand was supported by
increased household borrowing.

398

Here again, economic growth masks the increasingly

leveraged nature of the Canadian economy. Canada’s economy is deeply dependent on
exports, which represent almost 30% of GDP. However, exports averaged over 38% of
GDP from 2001-2007. That is a higher proportion than any other case study in this paper,
although the proportion of exports in the UK (30.1%) and Icelandic (56%) economies
have since surpassed Canada’s.

399

The financial turmoil in other developed economies

has also hurt Canadian exports through currency appreciation, as Canada loses ground in
400

the American market to lower-cost exporters such as China and Mexico.

Canada is the only economy considered in this paper to have been running a consistent
trade surplus at the onset of the crisis financial. By 2007, Canada had run a trade surplus
every year since 1999. With the exception of Iceland from 1993-1995, no other economy
401

in this paper posted a trade surplus in any year from 1991-2011.

The lower reliance on

debt for economic growth in Canada improved its ability to deal with a credit crisis
compared to the other economies outlined in this paper. Canada may have had more
flexibility in maintaining conservative lending practices due to the availability of nondebt capital resulting from the trade surplus. Canada’s continued economic growth since
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the crisis has been largely debt-fuelled as a result of dropping global demand, especially
among resource-importing Asian economies such as China.

402

The credit-fuelled global economic boom of the early-2000’s, especially in commodities,
fuelled Canada’s trade surplus from 1999-2007, providing the fiscal stability to withstand
the financial crisis. This subjects Canada’s growth to the risk of continuing subdued
demand as the recession moves down through the global supply chain – initially striking
consumer economies in Europe and the US, then transmitting through demand spillovers
to the manufacturing economies of Asia. The European sovereign debt crisis, combined
with high commodity prices, has prolonged the recession in Europe while dampening
American and Asian market confidence and growth.

403

Should this trend continue,

Canada will experience a similarly slow recovery, which until now has been avoided by
1) the flexibility in policy response capacity due to Canada’s sound finances going into
the credit crisis, and; 2) the time lag inherent in demand spillovers due to Canada’s
position within global supply chains.
The danger is that another market collapse with global ramifications, as seems plausible
if not yet probable in Europe, will find Canada much more indebted than it was in 2007.
This would reduce the capacity for monetary and fiscal stimulus, as well as the capacity
for households to temporarily fund consumption through debt. Canada would then find
itself in a position similar to those of the US and UK in 2007-2009, with credit
availability and economic growth dragging each other down in a self-reinforcing manner.
In the absence of global economic recovery, Canada can only sustain growth through
debt for so long, regardless of the strength and values of its financial system. This
illustrates the deeply integrated nature of the global economy. Given that the global
recession was initiated by the financial imbalances and malfeasance illustrated so far in
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this paper, the logical conclusion is that financial governance on a global scale is crucial
in preventing such a crisis in the future.
It is clear that the conditions underlying Canada’s strong position moving into the crisis
are not entirely endogenous or suggestive of a general ‘Canadian superiority.’ A degree
of luck in the timing of the crisis, and Canada’s resource-driven economy, played a role
in Canada’s ability to withstand the crisis. Nevertheless, the Canadian case demonstrates
the value of all four policy variables examined in this paper. Timely financial
interventions provided liquidity during the worst phases of the financial crisis, though no
banks faced immediate failure requiring forced mergers or nationalization. Monetary and
fiscal stimulus supported demand and contributed to a more prompt resumption of
growth. Finally, sound financial governance comprising countercyclical capital
accumulation by banks and a long history of public-private regulatory coordination
encouraged informational transparency in evaluating risk. This was amplified by the fact
that most financial activity in Canada falls within the regulated banking sector under one
of the six main banks, reducing exposure to either the American or domestic subprime
MBS markets. Canadian banks have been “too big to fail” for decades, but regulatory
coordination and strong corporate governance have prevented any from doing so in that
time.

7

Summing Up

The financial crisis prompted aggressive government response in four main areas. First
was an increase in short-term liquidity through the lowering of interest rates, as
exemplified by the lowering of the US prime lending rate by the Fed from 5.25% in
September 2007 to .25% by September 2008.404 However credit has become much more
expensive despite this easing, and households and businesses still face tightened credit
standards which has led some to argue that monetary policy is ineffective in containing a
crisis of this scale.405 The second main government response has been to recapitalize
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systemically important, or “too big to fail,” banks as “quasi-public institutions.”406 The
third response has been a general fiscal expansion, much more so in the United States
than in Europe, to further stimulate the economy once interest rates neared 0%.407 The
fourth, most long-term and as-yet little realized response has been that of domestic and
international financial reregulation.
Shortcomings in policy response have generally been in slow acknowledgment and
engagement of the (admittedly rapidly escalating) problems, for instance the US
governments’ allowing Lehman Brothers to fail in 2008 and ad hoc approach to TARP,
which sparked the initial global panic. Other examples include the muted pace of
monetary and fiscal stimulus in Europe as compared to the US and China, which has
contributed to the European sovereign debt crisis, and the halting momentum of financial
reregulation in the US compared to Europe.408 Market analysis has demonstrated three
trends in the effects of governments’ responses to the crisis. One is that comprehensive,
economy-wide policies are necessary and that “policy actions that are perceived to be ad
hoc or targeted at individual systemic institutions tend to exacerbate market fears...”409
The second main finding is that a coordinated response among states is crucial, and that
foreign policy responses strongly affected domestic interbank markets in affected
economies as “international spillovers of policy announcements intensified as the crisis
deepened.”410 Finally, while macroeconomic monetary and fiscal policy response by
governments filled short-term liquidity gaps, they did not ameliorate the general lack of
trust fuelling market volatility.
While helpful in mitigating the depths of the ensuing recession, no government actions
could have been realistically expected to prevent the global financial crisis once it began
to unfold. Moreover, policy responses of the type described can only be maintained in the
short-term, as the state institutions which were responsible for preventing a recession
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from becoming a depression have become highly indebted in the process, so that
“continued fiscal expansion faces limits and poses dangers.”411 The only effective remedy
for a systemic financial crisis of the scale recently seen is thus prevention through
prudent financial governance, the basis of which is effective financial regulation.

7.1

Financial Regulation, Deregulation,

and Oversight
Three problems with current regulation have been consistently pointed out. First, most
national regulatory frameworks focus primarily on micro-prudential governance –
limiting the risk exposure of individual firms without considering aggregate risk in the
broader financial system. For example, SIV’s were not subject to risk-based capital
charges under Basel II. This form of arbitrage allowed institutions to engage in what was
considered a low-risk activity at the individual level, but which destabilized the entire
system when undertaken simultaneously by many – especially dominant - firms.

412

This

process is prevalent in the US, UK, and Iceland cases. While Greek debt did not balloon
due to financial innovation, the misrepresentation of government debt until 2009
correlates to the misleading balance sheets of private financial institutions elsewhere.
Second, low inflation and economic stability through the 1990’s and early 2000’s
affected statistical risk measures, leading to the underestimation of risk premiums,
excessive risk taking, and eventually asset price bubbles. Finally, regulators have often
failed to enforce existing regulations.

413

This is visible in the US, UK, and Iceland cases

in the form of lax regulatory governance by national governments and central banks, and
in the case of Greece through insufficient oversight by Eurozone governance bodies
including the European Central Bank.
The deregulation of banking in the United States from 1980 to 2004 allowed the massive
increase in systemic risk, via opaque financial products which obscured counterparty risk.
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This created a more fragile network of debt obligations while mergers and consolidation
– also allowed by deregulation – simultaneously created firms which were too
systemically important to be allowed to fail. In the European case, monetary integration
made even small economies like Greece “too big to fail,” while denying them the
monetary and fiscal autonomy to mitigate economic shocks. The concurrent allowance of
riskier practices under Basel II extended this process worldwide, as increasing leverage
allowed debt-financed mergers and takeovers in Europe as well. Iceland and the UK thus
also saw financial firms’ balance sheets grow enormously. Easy credit also translated into
lower borrowing costs not just for banks, but also for national governments such as
Greece.

7.2

Financial Interventions

Financial interventions and bailouts have been necessary to mitigate the financial
collapse in all cases examined in this paper. The US and UK saw the recapitalization,
nationalization, or forced merger of several large and systemically important financial
institutions. Iceland faced financial collapses of such magnitude that state intervention
was not an option. Even Canada took measures to inject liquidity into banks in exchange
for illiquid, yet stable, assets. Iceland’s default on its foreign debt has not so far resulted
in the threatened exclusion from international lending. However firms and governments
in systemically important countries do not have this luxury, due to the global havoc such
defaults would unleash. It is thus apparent that, like financial institutions, some countries
are ‘too big to fail,’ while others are not.

7.3

Transmission of the Crisis

The transmission of the crisis was a direct result of global financial integration,
specifically the international cross-holding of debt among financial firms. Research has
shown that such financial integration “produces a significant increase in net debt for the
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most financially developed [countries].”

414

Moderate shocks to firm equity in these areas

can trigger systemic asset price corrections. This process of contagion is seen in the way
the US crisis spread almost instantly around the world, including to the UK, Canada, and
Iceland. It also applies to Greece in the sense that national debt experienced a price
correction as investors’ risk appetite shrank and demand plummeted.

7.4

Monetary Policy Response

The financial crisis and recession prompted unprecedented expansion in monetary policy
in the US, UK, and Canada. In all cases this eased pressure on banks’ balance sheets,
which allowed them to borrow from the government at lower rates, but did not on its own
trigger resumption of normal lending by banks. Monetary expansion thus helped mitigate
the financial crisis, and thus indirectly lessened spillovers into the real economy by
stabilizing the financial sector. However, monetary expansion did not stimulate the
resumption of normal economic activity, through increased investment, as is assumed by
Keynesian theory. Iceland, the only country to allow all systemically important banks to
fail, has since lowered interest rates and in fact resumed economic growth. This suggests
that the Keynesian prescription for monetary expansion is useful in stimulating economic
growth, in the absence of liquidity hoarding and severe debt burdens within the financial
sector. Greece was unable to undertake monetary expansion due to its Eurozone currency
membership, and in contrast to Iceland has suffered continued economic contraction.
This reinforces the link between monetary stimulus and the resumption of growth in
recession.

7.5

Fiscal Policy Response

Keynesian economic theory prescribes government spending to stimulate domestic
demand and mitigate contractions in economic activity. In the cases in this paper, fiscal
expansion to combat the recession was generally circumscribed by the marketability of
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government debt, with the exception of the UK. The American and Canadian cases
provide the strongest examples of fiscal stimulus. The governments of these countries
were able to undertake this due to the availability of borrowing (continued demand for
government bond issues), as well as sound public finances following years of budget
surpluses and debt repayment in the case of Canada.
The UK could arguably have undertaken stimulus as well, however the political exigency
of the 2010 general election which resulted in a Conservative-led coalition government.
Iceland was unable to engage in fiscal expansion due to the collapse of revenues
following the economic contraction and the cost of recapitalizing the Central Bank.
Subsequent Icelandic economic growth has instead stemmed from currency devaluation
and strong international demand for natural resources. Greece has been prevented from
pursuing fiscal stimulus as spending cuts are a condition of its continued rescue loans.
The more pronounced resumption of economic growth in Canada and the US as
compared to Greece and the UK thus support the Keynesian prescription of deficit
spending (if available) through fiscal stimulus. Iceland’s fate remains to be seen, and
further growth will depend upon the continuation of international commodity demand
and the effects of planned spending cuts which have yet to be enacted.

Variable
Fiscal Stimulus
Monetary Stimulus
Financial
Interventions/Bailouts
Financial Governance
Informational Transparency
shadow banking exposure
Severity of Financial Crisis
commodity/export
dependence
Economic Recovery

United
States
yes
yes

Iceland
no
no

United
Kingdom
no
yes

Greece
no
no

Canada
yes
yes

yes
weak
weak
high
high

no
very weak
very weak
high
high

yes
moderate
weak
high
high

no
n/a
very weak
n/a
n/a

yes
strong
strong
low
low

low

high
moderate,
slow

low

low

high

weak, slow

ongoing crisis

strong, rapid

weak, slow

Table 1 Policy Variables and Findings
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8

Conclusions

8.1

Global Financial Governance

Financial stability in a globalized world necessarily involves international coordination.
The experience of the Great Depression and Second World War led to the creation of the
international Bretton Woods institutions, which coordinated and promoted free trade,
financial stability and development.415 Following the Asian financial crisis the IMF, if
weakly, reiterated the lessons of the Great Depression by characterizing global financial
stability as a “global public good.”416 In the absence of a global government to provide
such a public good, the G20 has emerged as a global governance forum representing over
85% of world population and 66% of global GDP. Yet despite this and other coordinating
bodies such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the newly-created Financial Stability
Board (FSB), “there is no effective international mechanism” to ensure compliance with
internationally-agreed upon recommendations at the national level.417
Central Banks participate in the Bank for International Settlements’ Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision. The Basel committee creates policy recommendations, new
versions of which were recently accepted by the G20. Regulations must be
institutionalised at the national level, under the oversight of the Financial Stability Board.
Due to the consensual basis of international relations and governance, the effectiveness of
fora such as the FSB and Basel committee require “the authority and the political will” to
implement policies. Canada, the United States and the European Union all subscribe to
Basel II, although Canadian domestic capital requirements are more strict than formally
required under the treaty.
Canadian rules prohibit an official risk-weighted capital-to-asset ratio greater than 20:1.
Crucially though, American regulations do not include off-balance sheet activities in this
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calculation.

418

Canada’s regulatory framework thus directly mitigated the increase of

leverage, through off-balance sheet activity, which so destabilized American and
European commercial banks in the recent crisis. The Basel III reform proposals follow
“in Canada’s footsteps” by raising capital adequacy requirements for banks.

419

Basel III

was actually developed as a response to the global financial crisis, with the intention of
increasing prudence in liquidity management and bolstering counterparty confidence in
420

case of crisis.

However these reforms are still not as strict as Canadian domestic

regulations regarding minimum capital-asset ratios, or in their definition of what qualifies
as an ‘asset.’

421

8.2

Micro-prudential Solutions

Firm-level regulation is not sufficient to prevent systemic risk, but can be used to
discourage its origins. Moral hazard generated by “originate-to-distribute” requires
“better aligning the interests of mortgage lenders and investors,” for instance requiring
firms to hold onto part of their loans (as is the case in Canada) so that they face part of
the risk they generate. Incentives for overzealous risk-taking by executives could be
mitigated by compensation structures with longer time horizons.

422

The extension of

greater government intervention at the institutional (micro) and systemic (macro) levels
faces political resistance from neoliberal free market advocates. These critics rightly
point out the danger of moral hazard, stemming from public guarantees which encourage
excessive risk-taking.

423

The massive interventions required to stabilize the recent

financial crisis are the result of exactly this type of moral hazard. Goddard et al. argue
that “the system has been underwritten by a huge but previously implicit public subsidy,”
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whereby banks exploited their systemic importance to expand their balance sheets
“recklessly.”

424

Broadly speaking, five options exist for dealing with the problem of financial institutions
which are systemically “too big to fail,” relating to the problem of moral hazard. The first
option is to limit the size of financial institutions. The second is to set capital
requirements which mitigate the likelihood of illiquidity and thus failure. Third,
commercial and investment banking could be re-separated as they were under GlassSteagall. A fourth option is to standardize resolution regimes to permit effective and
predictable regulatory intervention in failing banks. The final, and so far most popular,
proposal is improved systemic risk monitoring and supervision, or macro-prudential
oversight. These are all politically contentious, and none but the last have gained wide
popularity due to their inherent government constraints on the private financial sector and
the lack of “clear evidence that they would have helped to avoid the recent crisis.”

425

If

anything, regulators have most strongly favoured the last proposal because it implies they
were constrained in their mandate, and thus failed to prevent the crisis due to
shortcomings in policy rather than performance.

426

Limiting the size of institutions and separating commercial and investment banks may
seem intuitively appropriate, however Canada has a large concentrated financial sector
which has allowed universal banking for decades. Standardizing resolution regimes, as
undertaken in the US and UK in response to the crisis, will help to mitigate extended
market panic during a crisis but will do little to prevent the buildup of systemic risk.
Enforced (and self-imposed) capital adequacy requirements and comprehensive
regulatory oversight are the defining characteristics that set Canada’s financial system
apart. Banks can be large and diversified, but only if they are transparent regarding their
activities, degree of leverage, and thus vulnerability to asset depreciation, liquidity
shocks, etc. The moral hazard implicit in ‘too-big-to-fail’ can only be addressed by the
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explicit input of all stakeholders in corporate governance – including taxpayers. Kay goes
so far as to argue that, “the banking system is part of the state... [it] holds a public
monopoly on creating money i.e. the state allows private banks to say that their deposits
are equivalent to real money backed by the [Central Bank].”

8.3

427

Macro-prudential solutions

Ragan proposes two new roles of central governance in the interest of financial stability,
“leaning” and “macro-prudential regulation.” Leaning against financial excesses

428

, is

now much less controversial than it would have been during growth years. However, the
problem remains that using interest rates to curb excesses will cause deviation from the
inflation target – the interest rate instrument applies to the entire economy, and can cause
unnecessary inflation if used to target imbalances in a specific narrow sector.

429

Sector

specific regulation is argued to be the best solution in this case, leaving Central Bank
monetary instruments free to pursue price stability.

430

Margin requirements (minimum

down-payments and maximum amortization periods) for bubble-prone industries such as
real estate have been advocated as a more appropriate tool for battling asset bubbles than
economy-wide rises in interest rates and thus borrowing costs. Such tools were preferred
by policymakers during the Keynesian heyday of the postwar period.

431

However, by

requiring minimum levels of creditworthiness from borrowers, margin controls do carry
the drawback preventing low-income households from accessing credit to buy their first
home and begin building equity capital.

432

“Macro-prudential” oversight arises from the need to oversee the financial system as a
whole, rather than just individual institutions, and arises from the interconnectedness of

427
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433

financial institutions.

This includes assessing potential sources of financial shocks and

anticipating potential spillovers and positive feedback loops. It is here argued that a
generally countercyclical policy is required to counter “the procyclicality of credit and
leverage that is a natural aspect of the economic cycle.”

434

This is consistent with the

Canadian experience – Canadian corporate, public, and household finances all exhibited
the most countercyclical behaviour in the lead-up to the financial crisis. While this has
partially to do with the good fortune of a commodity-fuelled trade surplus, conservative
corporate governance and the pursuit of a balanced budget since before 1999 also played
a significant role.

8.3.1

The role of Regulation

The immediate cause of the financial crisis in the US and other industrial countries was
the bursting of the residential real estate price bubble. Regulators allowed the bubble to
grow while overlooking the excessive financial and economic leveraging which would
amplify the damage of the bubble bursting. Existing regulations could have reduced or
prevented both conditions, mitigating systemic risk.

435

Regulatory transparency and

accountability is a prerequisite for any more effective regulation, including the recent
proposals for regulatory reform by the Obama administration and the amendments to the
international Basel accord under Basel III.

436

At the national level, expanding the role of government intervention in the economy,
even (perhaps especially) for the purpose of macro-prudential regulation, is politically
contentious. As Canova states, “it is uncertain whether Congress and the president can
muster the political will to impose regulation on such private centres of wealth, privilege,
and power, which cross national borders.”

437

As a counterpoint to the philosophical

arguments against government intervention in the economy, it can be argued that the
level of government intervention required in the face of a major financial crisis as seen
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recently suggests that “a better policy framework now might well permit ‘less’
government later.”

438

A Common theme in many analyses of the financial crisis is the procyclical nature of
crises spread through financial contagion and counterparty risk. Much recent research has
therefore concluded that a countercyclical prudential approach is needed to mitigate the
amplitude of business cycle fluctuations, generating smaller booms and much less severe
busts.

439

Significantly, research has found that Canadian banks’ follow a countercyclical

approach to capital buffers, building up reserves in periods of growth which can be drawn
upon during economic contractions.

440

Similar patterns are found in the German and

Norwegian financial sectors, whose economies also weathered the financial crisis
relatively well, while capital buffers have been found to be procyclical in other parts of
Europe.

441

This lends credence to the arguments of countercyclical prudential advocates,

and it has been argued that such an approach should form the basis of the Basel III
amendments, to “correct the [procyclical] deficiencies in Basel II that exacerbated the
subprime crisis.”

442

While widely seen as a move in the right direction, mandating countercyclical capital
buffers faces political barriers at the international and domestic levels. Internationally,
consensus will be difficult concerning restricting banks’ growth among governments
representing economies which are still in competition for capital and resources, despite
growing global interdependence. Domestically, higher capital requirements will increase
the cost of credit, “and while more regulation of banks has considerable appeal, more
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costly credit does not.”

443

The prioritization of financial stability will require a negotiated

political compromise concerning “societal preferences for stability over growth.”

8.3.2

444

The Limits of Monetary Policy

Schwarcz highlights that the role of the Fed as lender of last resort can fail to stabilize
crises because so much contemporary corporate financing occurs directly through capital
markets, rather than from banks and other financial intermediaries.

445

He proposes a

second government-sponsored “liquidity provider of last resort”, which could quickly
purchase securities in order to stabilize irrationally panicked markets. Since these
securities would be purchased at a discount, and the market for them subsequently
stabilized, the costs of such a program would be lower than directly lending to troubled
446

financial institutions.

Such a program was in fact undertaken by the Canadian

government, though on an ad-hoc basis, through the Insured Mortgage Purchase
Program.

447

Since all troubled securities would presumably not already be guaranteed by the
government, formalizing such an institution on a permanent basis would be unlikely to be
cost-neutral. However, mitigating the severity of market panics – where investors act
irrationally to the detriment of all – would offset instances where the purchase of troubled
assets proved unprofitable to the liquidity-providing institution through the benefits of
longer-term market stability. This would help mitigate the moral hazard implicit in
relying on a lender of last resort, which encourages higher risk-taking and incurs
substantial public losses if firms receiving emergency support fail regardless. A market
liquidity-provider of last resort, however, “can profitably invest in securities at a deep
discount from the market price and still provide a floor to how low the market will
drop.”

443

448

Such a framework would also provide the benefit of acting on a market-wide
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level, rather than focusing on rescuing successive firms as a chain reaction of institutional
defaults unfolds.

449

8.4

Conclusions for Canada

Canada has taken a much more statist, Keynesian approach to macro-economic policy
than the other cases in this paper. The Canadian government reduced deficits and paid
down debt during the growth years of the early 2000’s, and was thus in a much better
position to undertake monetary and fiscal stimulus when the crisis struck. Iceland ran a
substantial surplus from 2004 to 2007, and was also on a debt-reduction path. However
this was only possible due to the titanic financial bubble driving Iceland’s economy, with
the crisis quickly driving deficits to over 10% of GDP and total debt back over 100%.450
Canada thus combined countercyclical economic policy with a more state-centred
approach to policy response. An example of this is the comparison between American
and Canadian quantitative easing.
Under TARP, the US government acquired huge amounts of toxic assets, while Canada’s
IMPP added risk-free (or at least no added-risk), government guaranteed MBS’s to
balance sheets at CMHC. American taxpayers bought banks’ least valuable assets, while
Canadian banks received liquidity in exchange for only their least risky assets. However,
the cost of supporting demand through debt has resulted in strained financial conditions
for Canadian households and firms. Debt-to-income ratios in Canada are higher than in
the now-deleveraged US and UK.

449

451

Federal debt is still highly marketable as evidenced

Schwarcz, “Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis,” 73.
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by Canadian bond yields.

452

However, total government debt is now over 80% of GDP if

provincial and intra-governmental debt is taken into account.

453
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Canadian household finances, especially mortgage and other debt servicing, are now
highly vulnerable to fluctuations in the labour and housing markets.

454

The stability of

financial firms is dependent upon the ability to repay of the businesses and households
they lend to, and so Canada’s entire financial system is thus now much more exposed to
exogenous shocks than it was pre-crisis. Canada’s sound position going into the crisis and
its concerted policy response helped avoid a domestic financial crisis by addressing the
liquidity shortage and, crucially, by reassuring investor confidence in the solvency of
Canadian banks. This in turn has helped mitigate domestic spillovers from the global
economic downturn. However, global economic recovery remains impeded by the
European sovereign debt crisis, American deficit fears, and the slowdown of growth and
continued savings and exchange rate imbalances in Asia’s emerging economies.

455

No single national economy can completely shield itself from global macroeconomic
fluctuations, and Canada’s financial buffer has been largely depleted by the recent crisis.
The context for national economic governance and policymaking is now global. The last
three decades of economic and financial integration mean that shocks, especially in the
centres of economic and financial gravity in the US and Europe, have spillover effects for
the entire world and can be self-reinforcing.

456

Such crises are also procyclical,

reinforcing their own effects when originating in systemically important financial
institutions in the US and Europe.
Canada’s case shows that effective governance and prevention are the only true remedies
for softening economic shocks, supporting a Keynesian policy paradigm in the sense that
the state must intervene to reduce the amplitude of the economic cycle to a socially
acceptable and sustainable level. The American, British, Greek, and Icelandic cases do
not represent the failure of neoliberal approaches, however, as they entailed deficit

454
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spending both in times of growth and recession. Neither Keynesian nor neoliberal models
advocate the type of moral hazard and unrestrained risk-taking exhibited by the four nonCanadian case studies in this paper. However, financial and economic globalisation
involves institutions which by their very scale and systemic importance are too big to fail,
requiring government regulation and subsequently, as has been shown, coordination of
such regulation at the international level. Basel III is an example of the attempt at global
harmonization of liquidity risk management practices, and provides new metrics for
regulators to monitor and stress-test financial institutions.

457

Financial globalisation and innovation have created forms of systemic risk which are
structural rather than cyclical. Thus, neither a Keynesian nor neoclassical approach to the
business cycle as such is in question regarding financial governance, although Canada
certainly benefitted from following a more countercyclical macroeconomic platform.
Rather it is the paradigmatic difference between interventionist versus laissez-fair
oversight of the financial industry which is the key variable here. For decades the
American government has subsidized housing as a democratically popular public good.
However the lack of transparency in funding this provision – and extension to the private
sector of similarly opaque funding privildeges – metastasized into system-wide
underestimation of risk. This was transmitted worldwide through financial and economic
globalization. The greater the degree of transparency and oversight in governance, the
less opaque and imbalanced are institutional finances allowed to become. This holds true
whether the institution in question is an investment bank, a government-sponsored
enterprise, or a national government – hidden and unmanageable debt sooner or later
results in a re-evaluation of default risk when it is revealed. The greater is the discrepancy
between the institution’s accounting claims and reality, the sharper the correction and the
greater the resulting dislocation.
The size, systemic importance, interconnectedness, and sheer profligacy of financial
institutions (and national governments) led to the recent financial and economic crisis
occurring on a global scale. As authority for global governance, emergent in such bodies
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as the Financial Stability Board, is at an as-yet nascent stage, the meantime will require
close international coordination of financial and macro-prudential governance at the
national level. It is absolutely critical that transparency and accountability allow the
accurate appraisal of risk in global finance. The financial globalization arising from three
decades of neoliberal barrier-removal has thus ironically renewed the role of the state in
managing the most volatile sectors of the economy.

458

Left completely free of state intervention, markets might indeed conform to the rational
choice models presented by efficient market theorists. However, the abstention of
government from interfering when economic shocks generate massive social dislocations
is politically infeasible. Moreover, markets do not exist independently as discrete
systems, being preyed upon and interfered with by state interlocutors. Markets exist
because of and within the legal frameworks established over time by states themselves.
Indeed, it has been argued that rational-choice market expectations came to the fore after
the 1980’s because of the stability engendered by decades of Keynesian economic
management.

459

Investment banking can increase profitability and better distribute risk,

as can securitization. However just as unregulated investment banking resulted in the
1929 crash and Great Depression, so too has unregulated securitization resulted in
financial and economic crisis in this century.
This paper has shown that regulation promoting risk transparency is crucial in avoiding
the buildup of systemic risk which threatens financial stability, and by extension the
economic and social systems which have come to depend upon it. Countercyclical
policies in financial and economic governance are also crucial in mitigating the effects of
market corrections should such risk develop. This applies both to the prevention of
economic bubbles as well as the response to their collapse. The lesson is not that
securitization is bad, but that it must be regulated at the national level, and coordinated by
national agencies at the international level, if its benefits are not to be outweighed by the
economic and social costs of unsustainable bubbles, booms and busts.
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Glossary of Terms
Asset-backed Security (ABS): A security whose value and payments are derived by a
pool of underlying assets. These assets are typically illiquid and difficult to sell
individually, so are collateralized into ABS to generate income.
Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO): A type of asset-backed security which derives
value and payments from underlying fixed-income assets, such as mortgages or bonds.
Credit Default Swap (CDS): A contract or agreement whereby the protection buyer
makes a series of payments to the seller, in exchange for a payoff in case of default of a
credit instrument (such as a bond or loan).
Financial Governance: The act of governing finance at the national and international
levels, relating to decisions that define expectations, grant power, and verify performance
regarding the management, policies, guidance, and decision-rights of public and private
stakeholders in the financial sector.
Fiscal Policy: The use of government revenue collection (taxation and borrowing)
expenditure to influence aggregate demand, resource allocation, and income distribution.
Fiscal Stimulus: The process of increasing government spending and decreasing tax
rates to increase aggregate demand. Keynesian theory prescribes fiscal stimulus during
times of recession in order to achieve price stability, reduce unemployment, and
encourage economic growth.
Monetary Policy: the process of controlling the money supply, through open market
operations and discount window lending, by the national monetary authority. Monetary
policy typically aims to maintain stable interest and inflation rates, with the long-term
goal of price stability. ‘Expansionary’ monetary policy refers to increasing the money
supply with the aim of reducing the cost of borrowing and stimulating investment.
‘Contractionary’ monetary policy refers to reducing the money supply, with the aim of
increasing the cost of borrowing and curbing inflation.
Monetary Stimulus: The process of increasing the money supply to reduce the cost of
credit and stimulate investment and economic growth.
Mortgage-backed security (MBS): An asset-backed security representing a claim on
interest payments from securitized mortgage loans.
Securities: Financial assets yielding interest or dividends, such as shares or bonds.
Securitization: the pooling of contractual debt obligations to be sold to investors in
exchange for regular interest payments deriving from the underlying debts’ repayment.
Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV): A legal entity operating as a finance company
for the purpose of issuing short-term securities at low interest rates and buying longerterm securities at higher interest, in order to generate a profit to be passed on to investors.
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